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NOTES
The Indigent's Right to Counsel and the Rule of
Prejudicial Error
The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution provides that the accused
in a criminal case shall have the right to "the Assistance of Counsel for
his defence." In a discussion of this right, it is necessary to distinguish
between the right of an accused to be represented by counsel whom he
has retained, and the right of an indigent to have representation at state
expense. At the time of the adoption of the Constitution, the right of
representation was well established in the United States, although current
English practice denied the right in any felony except treason.' Until re-
cent time, however, "right to counsel" provisions in the federal and state
constitutions were not interpreted to award an indigent the right to ap-
pointed counsel, although certain early statutes gave such a right in
capital cases.2  In the past two decades, the Supreme Court has handed
down numerous decisions on the issue of an indigent's right to court-ap-
pointed counsel in capital and noncapital cases arising in the state and
federal courts. As will be indicated in the discussion to follow, the de-
cisions are somewhat conflicting, and have not yet coalesced into a
definitive rule. Nonetheless, from the mass of decisions and statutes, there
emerges an amorphous standard of the situations in which the accused
has a right to court-appointed counsel. The procedural obstacles facing
an indigent seeking to vindicate his right, and the effect of a finding of
infringement have been of paramount importance in shaping the existing
standard, and will have great influence in directing the future trend of the
law upon a question which, in view of the large number of persons facing
trial who are indigent, is far from academic.
3
THE RULE IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
Since 1790, when Congress enacted a statute to that effect, 4 a duty
has been imposed upon the federal courts to appoint counsel in every
capital case where the accused was not otherwise represented. Al-
though federal judges had frequently furnished counsel to indigents faced
with noncapital charges, appointment had not been established as a mat-
ter of right,5 until, in 1938, the leading case of Johnson v. Zerbst 6 en-
tailed a reconsideration of the problem. The defendant, who had neither
requested nor been furnished wth counsel at his trial for a noncapital
offense in federal district court, filed a petition for habeas corpus, alleg-
ing that the failure of that court to appoint counsel to represent him
was a denial of his rights under the Sixth Amendment. In sustaining
his contention, the Supreme Court held that every indigent defendant
on trial in a federal court has the right to court-appointed counsel, unless
he has competently and intelligently waived that right. This requirement
1. 5 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 192 (3d ed. 1945).
2. 1 STAT. 118 (1790). This provision now appears as 18 U. S. C. § 3005 (Cong.
Serv. 1948). For a listing of early state statutes covering the indigent's right to
counsel, see Betts v. Brady, 316 U. S. 455, 467 (1942).
3. See MOLEY, OUR CRIMINAL COURTS 62 et seq. (1930).
4. See note 2 supra.
5. See Bute v. Illinois, 333 U. S. 640, 661 (1948) ; Holtzoff, The Right of Counsel
Under the Sixth Amendmient, 20 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 1, 8 (1944).
6. 304 U. S. 458 (1938).
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was forthwith enacted into the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
7
Since 1938, the only important question arising from federal trials has
been whether, in fact as well as form, the accused waived his right to
appointment.8
THE INDIGENT'S FEDERAL RIGHTS IN STATE COURTS
The extent to which state courts must appoint counsel to comply
with the Federal Constitution is a presently unsettled area of the law.
Since the guarantees of the Bill of Rights are per se applicable only to
the Federal Government,9 it is clear that the petitioner claiming a viola-
tion of his constitutional rights must do so through the Fourteenth
Amendment. Until 1932, the Supreme Court had given little considera-
tion to the indigent's right to counsel in the state courts. In that year, a
judicial milepost was reached in the leading case of Powell v. Alabama.'"
Nine indigent Negro youths were indicted for rape, a capital offense in
Alabama. Unrepresented at the trial, they were convicted, and sentenced
to death; the Supreme Court granted certiorari. After an exhaustive
consideration of the issue, the Court held that when an indigent faces a
capital charge, due process of law requires the state court to furnish him
with counsel. Since that time, numerous cases where the petitioner al-
leged conviction of a capital offense without the assistance of counsel
have been presented to the Court. In only one instance where the al-
legations were supported by proof did the Court fail to find a violation
of due process, and in that case the common law record recited a waiver
of the right."
Although the Supreme Court took pains to limit the rule of the
Powell case to a situation involving a capital charge, contemporary ob-
servers were of the opinion that the right would be extended to non-
capital crimes. Nevertheless, ten years later, in Betts v. Brady,'2 the
Court held that due process of law did not impose an absolute require-
ment upon state courts to appoint counsel for indigents charged with
noncapital offenses. The dissent by Mr. Justice Black foreshadowed the
views of a large dissenting minority at present consisting of Justices
Black, Douglas, Murphy, and Rutledge. The divergent opinions in this
case are of extreme importance in that they lay bare the fundamental
disagreement which, to this day, divides the Court. The majority, after
answering in the negative the hotly contested question whether the
Fourteenth Amendment imposed the mandates of the Bill of Rights upon
the states, went on to say that, in certain noncapital cases, a failure to
furnish the indigent with counsel may constitute a deprivation of due
process in that the defendant was prejudiced by lack of representation.
7. FED. R. CRIM. P., 44.
8. Where an intelligent defendant insists on conducting his own defense, it is not
error to permit him to do so. Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U. S. 269
(1942). But where the defendant is not made fully cognizant of her right to appoint-
ment, and does not exercise an intelligent choice, there is no waiver. Von Moltke v.
Gillies, 332 U. S. 708 (1948) ; accord, Handlovits v. Adcock, 80 F. Supp. 425 (E. D.
Mich. 1948).
9. Barron v. Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243 (U. S. 1833).
10. 287 U. S. 45 (1932).
11. Carter v. Illinois, 329 U. S. 173 (1946). The common law record which
formed the sole basis for review was not clear as to whether the indigent had intelli-
gently waived counsel, or whether he had merely failed to request appointment-the
Court presumed regularity.
12. 316 U. S. 455 (1942).
In other cases, such as that before the Court, a fair trial was possible
even though the accused stood alone. The minority took the position
that the Bill of Rights had been incorporated into the Fourteenth
Amendment, and that the state could not infringe upon any provision in
the former without violating the due process clause of the latter. In
this manner, the minority applied the right to counsel provision of the
Sixth Amendment to state trials.13 As an alternative ground for their
decision that the petitioner's constitutional rights had been violated, the
minority implied that the "fair trial" required by the due process clause
was in no case possible where the defendant was unrepresented. 14 Since
1942, the majority rationale has held sway, and the decision as to the
alleged denial of due process has turned on the majority justices' opinion
as to whether the particular case before them reveals that the accused
was prejudiced by a lack of representation. 5
An analysis of the decisions is complicated by the majority's use of
the term prejudice in two different connotations. In the bulk of the cases,
by prejudice, they have meant that because of the accused's traits, or the
nature of the crime, the possibility of prejudice stemming from the failure
to appoint was so great that actual prejudice would be presumed. In a
small number of the cases, the petitioner alleged actual prejudice result-
ing from a failure to appoint counsel, and if his contention was sustained,
the majority used prejudice in the conventional sense. This distinction
in terminology should be borne in mind when considering the factual
situations which the Supreme Court has accepted or rejected as special
circumstances under which a failure to appoint counsel deprived the ac-
cused of his constitutional rights.
Youth and nexperience.-A large number of the cases coming be-
fore the Court on the issue of denial of counsel involve minor defend-
ants. In a recent decision, Uveges v. Pennsylvania,'1 6 a seventeen-year-
old defendant, unrepresented by counsel, pleaded guilty to a charge of
burglary. In voiding the conviction, the Court laid stress upon the belief
that a person of such tender years could not adequately defend himself,
and that lack of counsel was therefore prejudicial. Previous cases have
likewise indicated that the Court will not suffer an unrepresented minor's
conviction to stand.17 A related factor-that of intelligence and familiar-
ity with courtroom procedure-has bulked large in a finding that failure
to appoint wag prejudicial. Where the record indicated that the accused
was possessed of sufficient intelligence to safeguard his own interests, and
that his previous trials had given him sufficient legal knowledge to con-
duct his own defense, appointed counsel has been held unnecessary to a
13. A discussion of the merits of the two positions is beyond the scope of this
Note since the issue reaches into the broad field of the relationship between state and
federal government. For a lucid presentation of the majority and minority views on
this controversial question, see Adamson v. California, 332 U. S. 46 (1947).
14. This view is underscored by the fact that in every case since 1942 wherein the
majority decided that a failure to appoint counsel had not violated the due process
clause, there has been a dissenting opinion criticizing the fairness of the trial. See,
e. g., Bute v. Illinois, 333 U. S. 640, 682 (1948) (dissenting opinion) ; Foster v. Illi-
nois, 332 U. S. 134, 141 (1947) (dissenting opinion).
15. See Betts v. Brady, 316 U. S. 455, 472 (1942).
16. 335 U. S. 437 (1948).
17. Wade v. Mayo, 334 U. S. 672 (1948) (18-year-old defendant); De Meerleer
v. Michigan, 329 U. S. 663 (1947) (17-year-old defendant). But cf. Canizio v. New
York, 327 U. S. 82 (1946).
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fair trial.18 On the other hand, the Court has found prejudicial error
in the failure to appoint counsel for an alien indigent whose knowledge
of English was slight, and of court procedure, nil. 9
Complexity of Issues.-The theory that counsel is not essential to
the fairness of every trial is grounded on the assumption that a reason-
ably intelligent layman can, in many cases, prepare and plead an adequate
defense pro se. In Betts v. Brady, the only issue presented was an al-
leged alibi, and this, the Court said, did not require counsel to insure
adequate presentation. In Rice v. Olson,20 the unrepresented indigent
was able to demonstrate that he had a valid jurisdictional defense which
would only have been apparent to the trained practitioner. Although the
Court set forth the general proposition that a complex case requires the
assistance of counsel, the issue appears to have been decided in the peti-
tioner's favor because of his showing of actual prejudice.
The Court is divided on the question of what constitutes a complex
issue. For example, in Bute v. Illinois,21 the majority felt that the de-
fenses to a charge of taking indecent liberties with children could be pre-
sented by the defendant pro se. The four dissenting justices maintained
that, even accepting the special circumstances test propounded by the
majority, the case before them was one requiring professional advice and
assistance, and that prejudice should therefore be presumed.
22
Error of Court or Trickery of Prosecution.-The ,rationale for the
long-obsolete rule that the accused had no right to be represented by
counsel of his choice was that the trial court would protect his interests.
2 3
Vestiges of this theory lurk in the background of the majority view
which denies a universal right to court-appointed counsel.2 4  Where the
trial court itself prejudices the accused, this rationale is patently inap-
plicable, and the Supreme Court has on occasion found a denial of due
process. In Townsend v. Burke,25 the trial court misread the accused's
record of prior convictions and apparently imposed a discretionary sen-
tence on the basis of this misunderstanding. In reversing the convic-
tion, the Court laid heavy emphasis upon this error as actual prejudice
which would not have resulted had the accused been represented. How-
ever, in Gryger v. Burke,26 decided the same day, the conviction was
affirmed, although the record clearly indicated that the trial judge er-
roneously interpreted as mandatory the life sentence which he meted out
to the unrepresented defendant. These two cases present no factual diff-
erences to justify findings that lack of counsel was in fact prejudicial to
Townsend, but not to Gryger, and one is strongly drawn to the con-
clusion of the four dissenting justices in the Gryger case that inconsistent
decisions are the inevitable product of a subjective case-by-case deter-
mination as to Whether the failure to appoint was prejudicial.
27
18. See Betts v. Brady, 316 U. S. 455, 472 (1942).
19. Marino v. Ragen, 332 U. S. 561 (1947).
20. 324 U. S. 786 (1945).
21. 333 U. S. 640 (1948).
22. For a typical example of judicial dispute as to whether a given case presented
complex issues, see Foster v. Illinois, 332 U. S. 134 (1947).
23. Co. INST. 3d *29.
24. Bute v. Illinois, 333 U. S. 640, 671 (1948) (presumption that the trial court
has safeguarded defendant's interests). But cf. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45, 61
(1932) (trial court not in a position to offer complete protection to defendant).
25. 334 U. S. 736 (1948).
26. 334 U. S. 728 (1948).
27. Id. at 736 (dissenting opinion).
When the prosecutor becomes a persecutor, and tricks or misleads
the unrepresented indigent into a prejudicial position, the Court takes
the view that failure to appoint counsel was a denial of due process. In
Smith v. O'Grady,28 the unrepresented defendant waived his right to
trial in reliance upon the district attorney's assurance that he would re-
ceive a light sentence; instead, he received the maximum. In voiding
the conviction, the Supreme Court pointed out that a desire to prevent
such victimization was one of the main reasons for giving an accused the
right to counsel.
Noninfluential Circumstances.-Many other factual patterns have
been unsuccessfully urged upon the Court as constituting special circum-
stances wherein the failure to appoint counsel should be presumed prej-
udicial to the accused. Chief among them is the contention that the
seriousness of the crime and possible punishment should be of substan-
tial weight in determining whether conviction of a noncapital crime with-
out counsel denied due process. In the Townsend case, the Court at-
tempted to stem this argument by saying that its finding of prejudice
was not in the least motivated by the fact that the petitioner had re-
ceived a severe sentence of twenty years.29 This observation is em-
phasized by the finding in Carter v. Illinois o and the Gryger case that
the unrepresented indigents had not been deprived of their constitutional
rights, although each had been sentenced to life imprisonment.
On behalf of the state attorney general, the principal contention has
been that the accused has waived whatever constitutional rights he may
have possessed. To the argument that a plea of guilty constituted waiver,
the Court has answered that even if the petitioner was guilty of some
offense, counsel was still necessary to ascertain that he was guilty as
charged.3 ' In taking a strong stand against an emasculation of the right
through an implication of waiver, the Court has likewise refused to find
waiver in a failure to request appointment, and has consistently held that
there must be an intelligent and competent refusal of counsel by an ac-
cused fully informed as to his rights.3 2  A lengthy delay in presenting
the violation of his right to appointment might be thought to weigh
against the petitioner because of the evidentiary problems presented by
the petition, and on the new trial. However, an examination of the cases
reveals that many of the successful petitions were raised many years after
the illegal conviction.
3 3
STATE STATUTES AND THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL
At the time of the adoption of the Constitution, statutes in a few
states directed that indigents facing a capital charge be assigned counsel.
34
In the nineteenth century, scattered judicial opinions stated that the right
28. 312 U. S. 329 (1941).
29. See Townsend v. Burke, 334 U. S. 736, 741 (1948).
30. 329 U. S. 173 (1946).
31. Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U. S. 471, 475 (1945).
32. Rice v. Olson, 324 U. S. 786 (1945). The value which indigents place upon
representation is shown by the fact that in only one case coming before the Supreme
Court has the record shown a deliberate and insistent rejection of counsel offered by
the trial court. Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U. S. 269 (1942).
33. E. g., Marino v. Ragen, 332 U. S. 561 (1947) (delay of twenty-two years;
state confessed error) ; De Meerleer v. Michigan, 329 U. S. 663 (1947) (delay of
fifteen years; petitioner released).
34. See note 2 supra and text.
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should be extended to noncapital cases.35 At the present time, all states
place an affirmative duty upon the trial court to appoint counsel for those
indigents facing a capital charge; but as has been indicated above,36 such
action is a requirement of due process. In their treatment of the indi-
gent's right to counsel in noncapital cases, the state statutes may be di-
vided into four groups. The first group, a small minority of the forty-
eight, provide that the trial judge shall advise the unrepresented de-
fendant of his right to counsel, and upon a showing of indigency, appoint
the same to aid him.37 The second group, comprising the majority of
states, direct the trial court to appoint counsel for the defendant upon his
request, and a showing of indigency.88 Such statutes can be justified only
on the assumption that an accused is aware of his legal rights-an as-
sumption which is unsupported by reality. It is significant that these same
states impose an affirmative duty of appointment in capital cases. The
third group leaves the appointment of counsel in noncapital cases to the
discretion of the trial court.3 9 While a philosophical argument against
such a statute is apparent-to wit, that if a right exists, the granting of
it is not a matter of discretion-the objection can be rested upon more
substantial grounds. In exercising his discretion, the trial judge will pre-
sumably examine the issues to determine whether they present sufficient
complexity to require the aid of counsel. Yet, at arraignment, the in-
dictment and plea form the sole basis for his decision. It seems evident
that possible complexities of the case cannot be apparent at this time,
and that if the trial judge decides that counsel is not required, valid de-
fenses may never be revealed. In a small minority of the states, the
statutory right to counsel is limited to capital cases. 40 Finally, in some
jurisdictions, narrow judicial interpretations have curtailed the statutory
right to counsel. 41  It is therefore clear that in only a few states is the
right to counsel effectively granted those indigents who are ignorant of
their rights-the very persons for whom statutory protection is neces-
sary.When the trial court has determined that representation is neces-
sary, there are two sources from which counsel may be obtained. The
traditional method calls for the appointment of a member of the local
bar; such is the current practice in the federal courts and the majority
of the states. A frequently voiced practical argument against an exten-
sion of the right to counsel is that an increased burden will be placed
upon members of the bar if, as is possible, they are required to serve
without fee, or in the alternative, that a heavy expense will be levied upon
35. See, e. g., Webb v. Baird, 6 Ind. 13, 18 (1854) ; Carpenter v. County of Dane,
9 Wis. 274, 276 (1859).
36. See text at note 10 supra.
37. See, e. g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 987 (Deering, 1941) ; CONN. GEN. SrAI. § 8796
(1949) ; N. Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 308.
38. See, e. g., OR. Comp. LAws ANN. § 26-804 (Supp. 1943) ; Wyo. CoMp. STAT.
ANN. § 10-805 (1945).
39. See, e. g., MD. ANN. CODE, art. 26, § 7 (Flack, 1939) ; N. H. REv. LAws, C.
428, § 2 (1942).
40. See, e. g., Miss. CODE ANN. § 2505 (1942) ; PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 19, §§ 783,
784 (Purdon, 1930).
41. Hamlin v. Commonwealth, 287 Ky. 22, 152 S. W. 2d 297 (1941) (judge-made
requirement that defendant must request appointment) ; People v. Crandell, 270 Mich.
124, 258 N. W. 224 (1935) (statutory right to counsel not applicable when defendant
has pleaded guilty).
the state fisc where an individual statutory fee is provided.42  A number
of states have established an office of public defender in an apparently
successful attempt to answer these objections, and in addition, to make
specialized counsel available to the indigent.43  Recent criticisms indicate
that the system is not always so successful in practice as in theory, but
the isolated examples of failure are outweighed by a general success.
44
Faced with a current trend toward extension of the right to counsel, the
system may be expected to find increasing favor with state legislatures.
PROCEDURAL PATHS FOR RAISING THE OBJECTION
In order to comprehend the difficult obstacles which await an indi-
gent seeking to assert a denial of his right to counsel, cognizance must
be taken of his situation following conviction. His attempt to obtain be-
lated legal representation may be frustrated by a not infrequent prison
practice which places severe restrictions upon communication with the
outside world during the initial period of confinement.45 The regular
avenue of appeal is often closed to him by statutes which require that
an appeal be perfected within a relatively short time after conviction,46
a difficult undertaking for one unrepresented at the trial. For these rea-
sons, the contention will usually be presented by an extraordinary writ;
in most jurisdictions the remedy would be habeas corpus; in a few,
coram nobis or a writ of error would be proper. The remedy is at the
discretion of the states, and their procedure must generally be followed.
4 7
Unfortunately, a few jurisdictions provide no comprehensible procedure
for raising this objection.48  Although all states permit the indigent to
make his petition in forina pauperis, certain of them refuse to appoint
counsel to plead the case. 49 The frequent result is an insufficient peti-
tion and an inadequate oral argument. Finally, the court is often limited
to the common law record, because of a statutory requirement that the trial
transcript and bill of exceptions will be considered only when made avail-
42. See Holtzoff, supra note 5, at 17. In a compromise which satisfies neither
objection, some states provide a totally inadequate fee. See, e. g., Miss. CODE ANN.
§2505 (1942) (fifty-dollar maximum fee); VA. CODE ANN. § 3518 (Michie, 1942)
(twenty-five-dollar maximum fee).
43. Among the states which have adopted some form of the public defender sys-
tem are California, Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana and Nebraska.
44. For a favorable evaluation of the system, see Freeman, The Public Defender
System, 27 MIcH. S. B. J. 13 (April, 1948). For an analysis of its defects, see Stew-
art, The Public Defender Systemn Is Unsound in Principle, 32 J. Am. JUD. Soc'Y 115
(1948). It is interesting to note that many foreign countries have adopted an equiva-
lent form of representation. See Ltr., 20 A. B. A. J. 252 (1934).
45. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458, 462 (1938); United States ex rel.
Bongiorno v. Ragen, 54 F. Supp. 973, 975 (N. D. Ill. 1944) (prison officials prohibited
the sending of petitions to the courts).
46. E. g., LA. CODE CRIM. LAw & PROC., art. 542 (Dart, 1943) (ten days after
sentence to make motion of appeal); N. Y. CODE CRIm. PROC. § 521 (thirty days
within which to file appeal).
47. Carter v. Illinois, 329 U. S. 173, 175 (1946). But the exhaustion principle
is not applicable when state remedies are illusory. See Marino v. Ragen, 332 U. S.
561, 564 (1947) (concurring opinion).
48. Id. at 567. Mr. Justice Rutledge castigated Illinois for what he termed a
procedural morass offering no substantial relief to the petitioner.
49. People ex rel. Ross v. Ragen, 391 Ill. 419, 63 N. E. 2d 874 (1945) (habeas
corpus a civil proceeding, hence appointment of counsel not a constitutional right).
But cf. Walker v. Johnston, 312 U. 8. 275, 278 (1941) : "We . . . appointed counsel
for the petitioner to insure adequate presentation at our bar."
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able at the petitioner's expense.Y' In such a case, the United States Su-
preme Court will limit the scope of its review to the record before the
state court."' These procedural problems furnish a number of nonfederal
grounds upon which to rest a denial of the petition, and since by defini-
tion, state remedies have not been exhausted, the federal courts are with-
out jurisdiction.52 As a result, a series of petitions must be directed to
the state courts before a decision on the merits is obtained.
3
Assuming a decision by the state court that failure to appoint counsel
did not violate a federal right, and an exhaustion of remedies in the
state appellate courts, the indigent can petition the Supreme Court for a
writ of certiorari, with an excellent chance of its being granted.54 Another
avenue through which the petitioner may eventually reach the Supreme
Court is a petition to a federal district court for a writ of habeas corpus.
Until recently, an exhaustion of state remedies, and a petition for cer-
tiorari from the judgment of the state supreme court, were prerequi-
sites.5 15 In Wade v. Mayo,"5 the Court modified this rule by saying that
even though there had been no petition for certiorari, the district judge
could at his discretion entertain the habeas corpus petition if injustice
might otherwise result. In the event that the petition contains allega-
tions which, if substantiated, would constitute a denial of the consti-
tutional right to counsel, the district court must grant a hearing,57 and
should it refuse to discharge the petitioner, he may press his claim to the
appellate levels of the federal system.
THE RESULTS OF A SUCCESSFUL HABEAS CORPUS PETITION
An extension of the right to court-appointed counsel by the Supreme
Court is frequently opposed on the ground that the retroactive effect
of such a ruling would be to release from penal servitude many presently
incarcerated criminals.58 An examination of the subsequent history of
50. E. g., ILL. ANN. STAT., c. 53, § 81 (Smith-Hurd, Supp. 1948). At some state
trials, no stenographer is present unless requested and remunerated by the defendant.
The procedure in federal district court offers a welcome contrast in that a court-
appointed reporter is present at every trial. 58 STAT. 5 (1944), as amended, 28 U. S.
C. § 753 (Cong. Serv. 1948).
51. Carter v. Illinois, 329 U. S. 173 (1946).
52. Hedgebeth v. North Carolina, 334 U. S. 806 (1948) ; accord, Phyle v. Duffy,
334 U. S. 431 (1948).
53. See Note, 15 U. OF Cia. L. REV. 107, 120 (1947) .(seven to twelve petitions
often necessary before Illinois procedural requirements satisfied). Compare the atti-
tude of the Supreme Court that a habeas corpus petition is to receive a liberal con-
struction. Holiday v. Johnston, 313 U. S. 342, 350 (1941).
54. See Carter v. Illinois, 329 U. S. 173, 174 (1946) : "In view of the importance
of the claim if valid, we brought the case here." One cannot but suspect that the
alacrity with which the Supreme Court grants these petitions is motivated by an
awareness of inadequate state remedies.
55. Ex parte Hawk, 321 U. S. 114 (1944).
56. 334 U. S. 672, 681 (1948).
57. REV. STAT. § 755 (1875), as amended, 28 U. S. C. § 2253 (Cong. Serv. 1948),
Walker v. Johnston, 312 U. S. 275 (1941). But it has been held that when the Su-
preme Court has denied certiorari after a state decision on the merits of the federal
claim, the district court will not ordinarily entertain the petition. United States ex rel.
Mills v. Ragen, 77 F. Supp. 15 (N. D. Il1. 1948).
58. See Foster v. Illinois, 332 U. S. 134, 139 (1947). It has been suggested that
by making failure to furnish counsel reversible error on appeal, but providing that in
a collateral attack, prejudice must be shown, a higher standard will be created for the
future while the stringent rule in collateral attack will prevent a general jail delivery.
Frank, The United States Supreme Court, 15 U. OF Cm. L. REv. 1, 27 n. 117 (1947).
This solution apparently proceeds on the questionable assumption that an unrepre-
sented indigent will be able to perfect his appeal within the relatively short time per-
mitted him. See note 46 supra.
cases where the petitioner has been released because of a failure to appoint
counsei for him fails to support this contention. In these cases, the basis
for releasing the relator from confinement is that by its failure to appoint
counsel, the trial court lost its jurisdiction over the defendant, and hence
could not enter a valid judgment. Since the original trial is of no legal
effect, a "second" trial does not constitute double jeopardy.59 There have
been instances in which the accused received a heavier sentence in the
second trial.60 The Supreme Court decisions finding a violation of due
process in the failure to appoint counsel for an indigent have been
predicated upon the concept that at a particular point in the trial, lack
of counsel was prejudicial. Under such rulings, the court assuming juris-
diction in the second trial must decide how much of the original proceed-
ings have been vitiated by the error. In theory, three solutions are
possible: (1) to render the original proceedings void ab initio, thus re-
quiring the state to proceed against the accused by a new indictment or
information; (2) to suffer the original indictment to stand, but to permit
the accused to submit a new plea; (3) to strike only that part of the trial
subsequenf to the point of prejudice. The striking of the indictment
appears objectionable both because the statute of limitations may have run
against the offense, and because it can hardly be said that the validity
of the indictment was affected by the error; whatever the rationale, no
court has required this solution.61 The second possibility has found most
favor with courts facing the problem,6 2 and appears to supply the most
equitable balance between the needs of accused and state. The point-of-prej-
udice theory is unlikely to receive judicial approbation because, notwith-
standing selection by the Supreme Court of a particular portion of the trial
wherein lack of counsel was prejudicial, it is highly speculative to assume
that prior portions were not also adversely affected by the error.63  A
more frequently litigated question is whether, assuming conviction on the
second trial, the defendant must be given credit for time served under
the void sentence.6" In the absence of a statute,65 the prevailing view
holds that while the trial judge may shorten the maximum length of the
new sentence, he has no power to resentence the defendant nunc pro tunc
59. Stroud v. United States, 251 U. S. 15 (1919) ; Murphy v. Massachusetts, 177
U. S. 155 (1900).
60. Robinson v. United States, 324 U. S. 282 (1945). On release from his orig-
inal life sentence because of a failure to appoint counsel the defendant was retried, and
sentenced to death. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction.
61. In State v. Stroemple, 355 Mo. 1147, 199 S. W. 2d 913 (1947), the state
elected to proceed against the defendant by way of a new indictment, and this pro-
cedure was upheld. It has been unsuccessfully urged by the accused that although
the statute of limitations has not run against his offense, a retrial consequent upon
a lengthy delay is invalid as a violation of the constitutional right to a "speedy
trial." Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 153 Pa. Super. 582, 34 A. 2d 905 (1943), aff'd
nenr., 349 Pa. 559, 37 A. 2d 443 (1944) ; cf. In re Knight, 144 Ohio St. 257, 264, 58
N. E. 2d 671, 674 (1944).
62. Commonwealth ex rel. Townsend v. Burke, 63 A. 2d 77 (Pa. 1949) ; Ex parte
Traxler, 148 Tex. Crim. 550, 189 S. W. 2d 749 (1945).
63. State v. Stroemple, 355 Mo. 1147, 199 S. W. 2d 913 (1947). The petitioner
unsuccessfully contended that the trial court erred in striking his plea to the original
indictment.
64. In many cases, the relator has served a considerable portion of his sentence
before being released under habeas corpus. See note 33 .rtpra.
65. E. g., MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 28.1085 (Callaghan, Supp. 1947) ; N. Y. PENAL
LAW § 1943; PA. STAT. Ax., tit. 19, § 894 (Purdon, Supp. 1948).
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the date of the original sentence. 66  This harsh rule has been applied
even where time served under the void sentence exceeded the maximum
penalty possible under the second conviction. 67 Such decisions indicate
that release under habeas corpus is far from the boon popularly sup-
posed, and that the voiding of convictions for failure to furnish counsel
has not had the result of enabling criminals to escape just punishment,
but rather of insuring that their punishment be just.
EVALUATION
The tenor of recent decisions indicates that, for the present, the
Supreme Court will adhere to the technique of examining each case com-
ing before it for special circumstances in which the lack of counsel was
prejudicial, and hence a denial of due process. This view represents a com-
promise between a reluctance to meddle in the local administration of
justice,68 and a desire to insure the "fundamental prikiciples of liberty
and justice" required by the due process clause. 69 As has been pointed
out in the foregoing discussion, this subjective approach has led to con-
flicting decisions, and the aggregate of cases decided since 1942 can
scarcely be said to furnish the states with a reliable guide as to when due
process requires the appointment of counsel in noncapital cases. Com-
plaint has been made of the burden placed upon state and federal courts
by the large number of appeals and petitions alleging denial of counsel,70
and it has been argued that a broadened rule will mean an increased
burden. In the case of state courts, the present burden is the result
o.f an intransigent attitude which places every possible procedural ob-
stacle in the way of one asserting this right.71 The federal burden is the
result of the narrow scope of the right under state law, and of the un-
certainty as to the federal due process requirement which makes the
filing of a petition in federal court a good gamble. In fact, the existing
appellate burden would be lightened by a broader rule eliminating the
current substantive and procedural uncertainty. The adoption of a rule
which requires state courts to appoint counsel for indigents in all criminal
cases above the level of petty offenses seems justified on both constitu-
tional and policy grounds. The argument that criminal procedure is a
matter for state control under the police power begs the question inas-
much as the requirements of the Constitution stand paramount over state
rights. Moreover, recent Supreme Court decisions on other aspects of
criminal procedure show the rule to be more honored in the breach than
in the observance. 72 One justification for refusing to impose an absolute
66. People v. Judd, 396 Ill. 211, 71 N. E. 2d 29 (1947) ; State ex rel. Drankovich
v. Murphy, 248 Wis. 433, 22 N. W. 2d 540 (1946). Contra: Owen v. Commonwealth,
214 Ky. 394, 283 S. W. 400 (1926) ; Stonebreaker v. Smyth, 187 Va. 250, 46 S. E. 2d
406 (1948). Since few convicts serve out their full terms, a reduction in the maximum
length of the sentence is of slight value to them.
67. In re Doelle, 35 N. W. 2d 251 (Mich. 1948). Contra: In re Leypoldt, 32 Cal.
App. 2d 518, 90 P. 2d 91 (3d Dist. 1939).
68. See Foster v. Illinois, 332 U. S. 134, 139 (1947).
69. Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U. S. 312, 316 (1926).
70. Goodman, Use and Abuse of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, 7 F. R. D. 313, 315
(1948).
71. See Note, 15 U. OF Cxi. L. REv. 107, 119 (1947).
72. For typical examples of federal control over state criminal procedure, see In
re Oliver, 333 U. S. 257 (1948) (requirement of a public trial) ; Patton v. Mississippi,
332 U. S. 463 (1947) (proscription of state practice excluding Negroes from juries).
requirement upon the states in the matter of appointing counsel is that
they should be allowed to meet federal behests in their own fashion; 73
yet, the actual control over state criminal procedure is just as great,
though less effective, under the present piecemeal determination of prej-
udicial error as it would be under a definitive rule.
To say that in a capital case prejudice is immaterial, that in a few
noncapital situations prejudice will be presumed, and that in the remain-
ing cases prejudice must be established, is to draw distinctions which
are unjustified in theory and unwieldy in practice. A constitutional dis-
tinction to the effect that an unrepresented defendant charged with a
capital crime, but sentenced to life imprisonment has been denied due
process, while one receiving a life sentence under a noncapital charge
has not, seems unjustifiable even under narrow legalistic reasoning; yet
an aggregate of two Supreme Court decisions has reached this result. 4
All would agree that an indigent's right to be represented by court-ap-
pointed counsel is grounded upon his need for one skilled in the paths
and pitfalls of the law. This need is based not upon a capital-noncapital
dichotomy, but instead upon the inability of any layman adequately to
defend himself.75 The effect of the present requirement that in the bulk
of the cases prejudice must be shown, is to proclaim the balance weight
between liberty and imprisonment to be the tenuous chance that the
prejudice suffered was made of record. From a practical viewpoint, the
retroactive effect of a broadened rule would not be great,76 and retroac-
tivity did not seem to weigh heavily with the Court where capital crimes
were concerned. Moreover, there appears to have been no exodus of
federal prisoners in the decade since the adoption of the all-inclusive rule
in Johnson v. Zer6st. While it is true that state legislation would avoid
the problem of retroactivity, the legislatures have shown no alacrity to
amend their presently unsatisfactory statutes on the right to counsel,
and give little indication of a future intention to do so.
77
The recent cases indicate that the Supreme Court is gradually in-
creasing the number of special circumstances in which state courts must
furnish the indigent with counsel. The evolution of the present rule in
the federal courts supports the belief that within the foreseeable future,
the current minority position will become the rule of decision, and will
require that counsel be appointed for indigents in all trials above the
petty offense level.78 Such a rule may be grounded either upon the
rationale that the "fair trial" required by the due process clause has not
been granted where an unrepresented indigent was convicted, or, less
likely, upon acceptance of the contention that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment made the guarantees of the Bill of Rights binding upon the states.
Under the system of case-by-case determination, it is conceivable that
an exact definition of a petty offense will not be delineated; nor indeed
73. See Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 335 U. S. 437, 449 (1948) (dissenting opinion).
74. Compare Tomkins v. Missouri, 323 U. S. 485 (1945), with Gryger v. Burke,
334 U. S. 728 (1948).
75. See Bute v. Illinois, 333 U. S. 640, 682 (1948) (dissenting opinion).
76. See text at note 58 supra.
77. Illinois offers the outstanding exception to this statement. See Ill. R. Prac.
& Proc., 27A, 400 Ill. 22 (1948).
78. A distinction between the procedural requirements for petty offenses and for
serious crimes would not be novel to the Court. See Schick v. United States, 195 U. S.
65, 68 (1904) (petty offenses do not require trial by jury).
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is one essential 9 If an exact definition is felt advantageous, conceivably
Congress could furnish it under the authority of the implementation
provision of the Fourteenth Amendment. For example, the statute could
provide that counsel be furnished in all criminal actions where the pos-
sible period of incarceration would exceed six months, thus embracing
the vast majority of crimes which require the assistance of counsel. Re-
gardless of supplemental legislation, the recommended rule is detrimental
to no one, and would be of immeasurable aid to unfortunate indigents
facing penal servitude. At best the objections are technical, and tech-
nicalities should not stand as a bar to a rule which insures justice to all,
not merely to those who can afford its price.
A. C. D., Jr.
Applicability of Federal Statutes to Noncontiguous Areas
The problem of the applicability of federal statutes to noncontiguous
areas has received little consideration from either legislators or courts.
Most statutes merely designate the area encompassed, by the use of such
phrases as "territories and possessions of the United States." Others
negatively exclude "foreign countries" from their coverage.1 Legislative
history sheds little light on the precise localities intended to be covered
and serves as evidence of the lack of congressional attention to this phase
of statutory draftsmanship.2  The reason lies in the fact that, historically,
few controversies resulted from this cursory treatment, for the few extra-
territorial areas under the exclusive sovereignty of the United States,
such as Hawaii and Puerto Rico, had sufficient identity of characteristics
to warrant this lumping together. The many new relationships estab-
lished between this country and extraterritorial areas as a consequence
of the recent war, however, make it imperative that Congress and the
courts address themselves specifically to the differences that exist. To aid
in this determination an analysis will be made of the various classifica-
tions of noncontiguous areas. A discussion of past and present considera-
tions shouldserve as a guide to the intelligent solution of the problems
of statutory coverage. The areas treated will be classified as: (1) owned
areas under exclusive United States sovereignty; (2) the Panama Canal
Zone-an anomaly; (3) areas leased by the owner-State to the United
States; (4) trusteeship territories; and (5) areas occupied by military
forces.
OWNED AREAS UNDER ExCLUSIVE SOVEREIGNTY
Areas actually ceded to the United States 3 present no international
problem because there can be no conflict of national rights. Thus, only
79. Cf. Mr. Justice Holmes in Irwin v. Gavit, 268 U. S. 161, 168 (1925) : "Neither
are we troubled by the question where to draw the line. That is the question in pretty
much everything worth arguing in the law .... Day and night, youth and age are
only types."
1. For a compilation of sixty-three statutes using the territories-and-possessions
formula, see Vermilya-Brown Co. v. Connell, 335 U. S. 377, 398 n. 11 (1948) (dissent-
ing opinion).
2. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae, p. 13, Vermilya-Brown Co. v. Con-
nell, supra note 1.
3. E. g., Alaska, American Samoa, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands.
national interests are to be considered in dealing with these annexed
territories; there is no problem of the interpretation of agreements among
several nations. This still leaves for determination, however, the status
of such territories in relation to continental United States.
No difficulties of consequence were encountered until the beginning
of the twentieth century, when the United States had acquired several
island areas (Hawaii, Puerto Rico) distant from the American continent.
Shortly thereafter the Supreme Court, in De Limna v. Bidwell,4 decided
that these areas were no longer "foreign countries" with reference to the
application of tariff regulations. In a companion case, Downes v. Bid-
well,5 however, it was held that though these areas belonged to the United
States they were not "incorporated" into the United States. This meant
that the geographical coverage of the Constitution did not include these
areas. From the five-to-four decision in this latter case stems the now
established doctrine of "territorial incorporation." 6 In incorporated ter-
ritories the Constitution applies to its full extent. In unincorporated ter-
ritories, though "fundamental rights" are guaranteed, "procedural rights"
are not.7 The differences are not clear and can only be determined by
reference to court decisions.8  It appears that the basic reason for this
distinction was the desire to permit the legislative and executive branches
to have a free hand in dealing with these areas, unhampered by consti-
tutional restriction. This was deemed necessary because of the great
differences in cultural and legal institutions, and the desire to avoid a
disruption of native mores and institutions-a recognition by the judiciary
of the need for specific congressional treatment of noncontiguous areas.
Although these early cases make the distinction between incorporated
and unincorporated territories, they do not define the terms or give tests
by which they can be determined. However, in Balzac v. Puerto Rico,
decided in 1922, the Supreme Court made it absolutely clear that in-
corporation is not to be assumed without an express declaration of Con-
gress or an implication so strong as to exclude any other view. The
Court assumed that when Congress intended to incorporate an area, it
would do so deliberately and with a clear declaration of purpose, and not
leave it to implication or construction.9 The organic act which, among
other things, conferred United States citizenship on Puerto Ricans was
held not to contain sufficient evidence of congressional intent to incor-
porate. Thus, even in relation to areas owned by the United States, there
is a reluctance on the part of the judiciary to classify an area as incor-
porated in the absence of the clearest intent of the political branches.
In addition to the classification of owned areas into incorporated and
unincorporated territories, 10 there exists the further classification based
4. 182 U. S. 1 (1901).
5. 182 U. S. 244 (1901).
6. See Coudert, The Evolution of the Doctrine of Territorial Incorporation, 26
COL. L. REv. 823 (1926).
7. See id. at 850.
8. Dorr v. United States, 195 U. S. 138 (1904) (no constitutional duty to pro-
vide Philippine citizens with trial by jury) ; Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U. S. 197 (1903)
(despite annexation by joint congressional resolution, Hawaii not incorporated, and no
constitutional right to grand jury indictment).
9. Balzac v. Puerto Rico, 258 U. S. 298, 311 (1922).
10. Alaska and Hawaii are the only two areas with the status of incorporated ter-
ritories. NoN-SELF-GOVERNING TERRIORIES, SUMMARIES AND ANALYSIS OF INFORMA-
TION TRANsulTTE TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL DURING 1947 at 395, 420 (U. N. 1948).
And see Rasmussen v. United States, 197 U. S. 516, 525 (1905) (series of congres-
sional acts held inferentially to indicate intent of Congress to incorporate Alaska).
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upon the enactment by Congress of an organic act to serve as a "constitu-
tion" for the area. These areas are classified as "organized but unincor-
porated territories." Other areas not governed by an organic act are
classed as "unorganized possessions."I'- They are usually under the juris-
diction of the Secretary of the Navy. All owned areas, by court decision,
have been held to come within the purview of statutes applying to "ter-
ritories and possessions." 12 The fact that the statute is enacted prior to
an area's annexation does not prevent its being covered.13
The common element in all localities thus far discussed has been
"ownership," with sovereignty in the United States. It has been strongly
contended that a transfer of sovereignty is essential if an area is to be
classed as a possession.' 4 If this view be accepted, the status of such
areas-as possessions-must of necessity be determined by the political,
i. e., the legislative and executive, branches.' 5 It is interesting to note
that in Vermilya-Brown Co. v. Connell, decided in 1948, the Supreme
Court by-passed this argument by stating that the determination of
sovereignty by the political departments "does not debar courts from ex-
amining the status resulting from prior action" 16--does not debar the
courts even though such action did not invest the United States with
sovereignty. The authorities cited for this proposition are two cases in-
volving territories over which the United States' sovereignty had been es-
tablished by the Department of State,17 and the cases therefore do not
support the proposition espoused by the Court. If sovereignty is neces-
sary in order to classify an area as a possession, it was improper for the
Court in this case to hold that the Fair Labor Standards Act (effective
in "territories and possessions") applies to an area over which the Court
agrees that the United States does not have sovereignty.
Granting that ownership is sufficient to place an area within the
classification of a possession, what is the nature of other areas not owned
exclusively by the United States? Experience with the Panama Canal
Zone highlights the increased difficulties and confusion that result from
acquiring an area under an agreement which does not provide for actual
annexation.
THE CANAL ZONE-AN ANOMALY
The Isthmian Canal Convention Is is comprehensive in that it gives
to the United States, in perpetuity, the greatest possible jurisdiction in the
Panama Canal Zone, without actually ceding the area to this country.
It provides, inter alia, that the United States shall have "all the rights,
power and authority within the zone . . . which the United States would
possess and exercise if it were the sovereign . . . to the entire ex-
11. Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands are classed as organized but unincorpo-
rated territories; American Samoa and Guam, as unorganized United States posses-
sions. NoN-SELF-GovERNING TEmRRTOiIEs, SUMmARIXS AND ANALYsIs OF INFORmATION
TRANSmITTED TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL DURING 1947 at 405, 412, 429, 442 (U. N.
1948).
12. It re Lane, 135 U. S. 443 (1890). But cf. Ex parte Morgan, 20 Fed. 298 (W.
D. Ark. 1883).
13. Puerto Rico v. Shell Co., 302 U. S. 253 (1937).
14. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae, p. 18, Vermilya-Brown Co. v. Con-
nell, 335 U. S. 377 (1948).
15. Jones v. United States, 137 U. S. 202 (1890).
16. Vermilya-Brown Co. v. Connell, 335 U. S. 377, 380 (1948).
17. Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324 U. S. 652 (1945) ; De Lima v. Bidwell,
182 U. S. 1 (1901).
18. 33 STAT. 2234 (1903).
clusion of the exercise of the Republic of Panama of any such sovereign
rights, power or authority." 19 It would seem that this agreement is
sufficiently comprehensive to avoid any international difficulties. Yet, in
1946, when the United States included the Zone in its report to the
United Nations on nonselfgoverning territories, 20 the Panamanian dele-
gation strongly objected in the General Assembly, contending that
sovereignty over the Canal Zone remained in the Republic of Panama.
21
In its 1947 report to the United Nations, therefore, the United States
omitted this area "pending clarification of this quesion with the Republic
of Panama." 22
If it is possible for one nation to retain "sovereignty" and yet grant
in perpetuity the exercise of "sovereignty," then this is the existing situa-
tion. That the controversy involves more than a mere logomachy is
evidenced by the Panama Supreme Court's holding that its jurisdiction
might be extended to cases arising within the Zone and involving the
Zone's residents.2 3  That court has also decided that the area is not
"foreign territory" in relation to the Republic.
24
In the determination of the Zone's status by our own Government,
there exists confusion. The executive department maintains the position
that the United States exercises full sovereign rights, and in a most re-
cent statement is careful to exclude this area from those over which we
are sovereign.2 5 On the other hand, shortly after the Convention was
concluded, the United States Supreme Court commented that "it is
hypercritical to contend that the title of the United States is imperfect,
and that the territory described does not belong to this Nation, because
of the omission of some of the technical terms used in ordinary convey-
ances of real estate." 20 In a later case, however, the Court held the
Zone to be a foreign port within the meaning of a statute dealing with
compensation allowable for transportation of mail by American ships
between the United States and "any foreign port." 27 These apparent
inconsistencies stem from an attempt to arrive at a practical result with
respect to the particular controversy before the Court.
The legislative branch has reflected this confusion of status in many
statutes by failing to maintain a consistent classification of this area.
28
19. 33 STAT. 2234, art. I1 (1903).
20. See NoN-SELF-GovERNING TEmuTORIES, SumMAIuEs OF INFORMATION TRANS-
MITTED TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL DURING 1946 at 121 (U. N. 1947).
21. THE UNITED STATES AND NON-SELF-GOVERNING TERRITORIES 21 n. 1 (U. N.
1947).
22. Summary of Information Transmitted by the Government of the United States
of America (U. N. Release A/320, July 25, 1947).
23. 2 HAcKWoRTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 172 (1941).
24. In re Bartlett, Lauterpacht, Annual Digest 1929-1930, case no. 51 (Panama
Sup. Ct. 1930).
25. Letter to the Attorney General from the Acting Legal Adviser to the Secre-
tary of State, quoted in Memorandum for United States in Support of Petition for
Rehearing [hereinafter United States Memorandum], p. 8, Vermilya-Brown Co. v.
Connell, 335 U. S. 377 (1948).
26. Wilson v. Shaw, 204 U. S. 24, 33 (1907).
27. Luckenbach S. S. Co. v. United States, 280 U. S. 173 (1930).
28. E. g., Atomic Energy Act of 1946, 60 STAT. 774, 42 U. S. C. § 1818(d) (1946)
("The term 'United States,' when used in a geographical sense, includes all Territories
and possessions of the United States and the Canal Zone") ; Settlement of Mexican
Claims Act of 1942, 56 STAT. 1063, 22 U. S. C. § 672 (1946) ["The term 'United
States,' when used in a geographical sense, includes . . . possessions (including the
Philippine Islands), and the Canal Zone"]; Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, 52 STAT.
979, as amended, 49 U. S. C. §401(29) (1946) ["'Possessions of the United States'
means . . . (b) the Canal Zone"].
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Congressional awareness of this problem has led to specific inclusion or
exclusion of the Canal Zone, by name, from a statute's coverage.2 9 Where
no statutory mention is made, and in the absence of controlling couft
decisions, administrative agencies usually treat the area as a possession
under United States sovereignty, or seek clarification from the Depart-
ment of State or other governmental agencies.30
The strategic and commercial implications inherent in any conflicts
and inconsistencies that arise, appear to be the prime factors affecting
their disposition, the agreement with the Republic of Panama being com-
prehensive enough to give this country a free hand in their solution.
LEASED AREAS
In 1941 the United States leased several areas from Great Britain
for a period of ninety-nine years.31 As contrasted with the sweeping
authority conferred on the United States by the Isthmian Convention,
3 2
this agreement confers only limited rights. The lease confines our usage
to the establishment and maintenance of military and air bases and
provides, inter alia, that no business enterprises may be established,
3 3
that immigration laws are suspended only to admit American military
forces and other persons connected with the bases, and that customs duties
are lifted for limited purposes.3 4 Many of the problems implicit in treaty
interpretation may possibly arise in relation to these areas. International
interests and rights, as well as national policy, will have to be considered
in dealing with the leased bases.
Before any federal statutes can be said to apply, it must first be de-
termined whether this country has jurisdiction under the terms of the
agreement. Granting such jurisdiction, there is the further problem of
whether statutes using the customary "territories and possessions" clause
apply to leased bases. Do these areas fit into any of the categories dis-
cussed above, so that a statute applyihg to possessions will also apply
to the leased areas, or are they definitely not possessions and therefore
to be excluded from such a statute's coverage? Does the issue resolve
fito one of statutory interpretation, or one of interpretation of the lease
agreement? These questions already have passed from the realm of
philosophical speculation into the arena of practical controversy via the
recent decision in Vermilya-Brown Co. v. Connell.35 The Supreme Court,
four justices dissenting,386 held that the Fair Labor Standards Act,
37
which by its terms covered "territories and possessions of the United
States," was operative at a leased base in Bermuda. The district court
29. E. g., Communications Act of 1934, 48 STAT. 1065, as amended, 47 U. S. C.
§ 153(e) (1946) ["possession of the United States (other than the Canal Zone)"];
Air Commerce Act of 1926, 44 STAT. 573, as amended, 49 U. S. C. § 170(b) (1946)
(applies to possessions, "but shall not include the Canal Zone").
30. Letter to the Solicitor General from the Administrator of the Wage and Hour
and Public Contracts Divisions of the Department of Labor, quoted in United States
Memorandum, p. 20.
31. 55 STAT. 1560 (1941).
32. See text at notes 18-19 srupra.
33. 55 STAT. 1560, art. XIV(1) (c) (1941).
34. 55 STAT. 1560, art. XIII(l) (1941).
35. 335 U. S. 377 (1948). Justices Black, Reed, Douglas, Murphy, and Rutledge
were in the majority.
36. The Chief Justice and Justices Frankfufter, Jackson, and Burton.
37. 52 STAT. 1060 (1938), as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 201 et seq. (1946).
had held the Act inapplicable on the ground that sovereignty was a neces-
sary requisite for the area to be a possession, and whether the United
States had sovereignty was a political question.38 The Department of
State had decided that the necessary sovereignty was lacking; 39 ergo,
the Act did not apply. The district court's conclusion was perfectly
logical if possession is limited to a historical definition, for prior to the
acquisition of leased bases the only areas that could have been included
were those over which the United States exercised sovereignty. However,
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the decision,40 and
rejected the view that this was a political question. After examining the
lease, agreement the court decided that the effect of its various provisions
"compels the conclusion that the areas are subject to fully as complete
control by the United States as obtains in other areas long known as
'possessions' of the United States." 41 Thi conclusion was most un-
fortunate and seems erroneous, for a cursory reading of the lease agree-
ment 42 is sufficient to disclose that American rights in these areas do not
remotely approach the complete sovereignty exercised in owned areas
and the Panama Canal Zone.4 3  This lumping together of the several
categories of areas discussed in this Note is the precise thing that the
courts must avoid, for it is beyond the judicial province to annex terri-
tory by decision. The history of the negotiations discloses that annexa-
tion was contemplated but was rejected because of this Government's
reluctance to incur any unnecessary obligations.44  The court of appeals
decision has invoked hostile criticism from England 45 and from the De-
partment of State.
4U
The Supreme Court, though affirming the decision, did so on en-
tirely different grounds. The majority reasoned that since there was
jurisdiction sufficient to warrant regulation of wages and hours at the
base, the sole issue was one of statutory interpretation. The word pos-
session in the Act being ambiguous and not capable of a definition that
would include or exclude the base, the Court stated that it must examine
the policy of the Act, and the Court found it reasonable to interpret its
provisions as having force where the nation had "sole power" 47 rather
than to limit its coverage to sovereignty. Such an interpretation was
consonant with the Administrator's inclusion of the Canal Zone within the
meaning of possession. The Court concluded, therefore, that the policy
warranted an interpretation of the word possession to include "foreign
territory" under lease for bases.
48
38. Connell v. Vermilya-Brown Co., 73 F. Supp. 860 (S. D. N. Y. 1946).
39. Id. at 861.
40. Connell v. Vermilya-Brown Co., 164 F. 2d 924 (2d Cir. 1947).
41. Id. at 927.
42. See text at notes 33-34 supra.
43. See text at notes 18-19 supra.
44. 1 HULL, MEmonRs 834 (1948).
45. ". . . it is submitted that the court went too far . . . since (i) the con-
trol is not in fact so complete in view of the various limitations on United States
authority to which the court did not refer .. . " Note, 2 INT'L L. Q. 235, 237
(1948).
46. ". . . the Department of State feels constrained to inform us that it 're-
gards as unfortunate' the conclusion of the court below. . . ." Vermilya-Brown
Co. v. Connell, 335 U. S. 377, 401 (1948) (dissenting opinion).
47. Id. at 390 (emphasis added).
48. Ibid.
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While the Supreme Court must confine itself to the narrow issue
presented by a particular case, this decision leaves much to be desired.
First, the Court avoided the political question by agreeing with the De-
partment of State's determination that the United States did not have
sovereignty and that the base was foreign territory. However, it seems
the Court was wrong in stating that this country has "sole power" in
the area.49 Unfortunate consequences have already resulted from the
Court's failure openly to repudiate the reasoning of the court of appeals.
The Administrator's inclusion of the Panama Canal Zone within the
meaning of possession 5 0 was not a valid factor for the Court to consider
in reaching its conclusion.5 ' The Court in its anxiety to give a liberal
construction to this remedial statute overlooks the practical difficulties
resulting from its decision3 2  These difficulties have been pointed out by
the Departments of State 5 3 and Labor,5 4 and by the Army " and Navy.55
Further, in merely holding that this Act applies to the bases, the Court
opens the door to the possible application of this and all similarly worded
49. See text at notes 33-34, 45-46 supra.
50. See text at note 48 spra.
51. Compare the exclusive exercise of sovereignty in the Canal Zone with the lim-
ited rights in leased areas.
52. Actually, few American workmen are affected since most receive hourly rates
and overtime benefits exceeding statutory requirements. Letter to the Attorney Gen-
eral from the Secretary of the Army, quoted in United States Memorandum, p. 11.
53. "The Department does not share the assurance of the Court that the house
of assembly of Bermuda or other colonial legislatures might not undertake legislation
similar to the Fair Labor Standards Act to control labor relations on the bases ...
administrative difficulties have arisen in the bases by reason of the application to con-
tractors' employees of workmen's compensation laws of both the United States and
the colonies concerned." Letter to the Attorney General from the Acting Legal Ad-
viser to the Secretary of State, quoted id. at 8.
54. The Administrator of the Wage and Hour and Public Contracts Divisions of
the Department of Labor anticipates two major problems as a result of the Court's
decision. First, there is the problem of determining whether other defense bases are
covered by the Act. This the Administrator must do, pending authoritative guidance
from the courts. Since under this decision, he can no longer rely upon traditional
concepts of sovereignty, or State Department determinations, he must enter a field of
interpretation unaided by his previous experience with the Act, legislative history,
the language of the Act, or court decision. The determination may involve interpreta-
tion of international agreements with which, again, he has no experience. Thus he
does not know whether defense bases such as Arabia, Canada, Greece, Iceland and
Okinawa are covered. Second, he anticipates difficulties in applying the Act in areas
over which the United States does not exercise full sovereignty, especially where
foreign employers and alien labor are involved. Problems of courts with proper juris-
diction and venue to apply the Act's sanctions are bound to arise, and the Wage
and Hour Division has neither the appropriation nor the organization to enforce the
Act in far-flung outposts. Letter to the Solicitor General, quoted id. at 20.
55. It is anticipated that, in connection with public contracts, the Government will
suffer increased costs running into the hundreds of millions. The most serious of the
problems resulting from the decision is that native workmen (who outnumber Ameri-
can workmen by ten to one) are now covered by the Act. In the hiring of natives,
"the local government in many countries will impose nuzimum wage standards which
dare not be violated." These governments contend that to pay natives according to
American standards would seriously disrupt the local economy. The Court's ruling
that natives are covered and that these areas are possessions may cause foreign gov-
ernments to compel curtailment or abandonment of projects, and will hinder future
arrangements for construction on foreign soil. Letter to the Attorney General from
the Secretary of the Army, quoted id. at 11.
56. It is the Navy Department's policy to employ local labor at leased bases to
the maximum extent, and to make wage and labor practices conform as nearly as pos-
sible to the usual standards of the particular locality. Application of the Fair Labor
Standards Act "may well create conditions which would adversely affect the coopera-
tion heretofore given Navy contractors by local authorities." Letter to the Attorney
General from the Acting Secretary of the Navy, quoted id. at 18.
statutes to many other types of areas, e. g., trust territories and occupied
areas. Whether other acts also apply to leased bases is not decided by this
case; query whether each act must come before the courts for a deter-
mination based on the "statute's policy." In the interim there can be no
certainty as to which of these acts does have extraterritorial effect.
Spelar v. United States U is an example of the adverse consequences
resulting from the Supreme Court's decision. The District Court for the
Eastern District of New York held that the Federal Tort Claims Act 58
(excluding from its coverage any claim "arising in a foreign country")
did not apply in leased areas. The court reasoned that since the Act
constituted a waiver of the sovereign's immunity from suit, it should be
narrowly construed. On appeal, 59 the same court of appeals that decided
the Vermilya-Brown case, after calling attention to the Supreme Court's
affirmance of that decision, stated that although different statutes were
involved, the prior decision was persuasive, if not "well-nigh conclusive,"
authority for reversal. The court found it difficult to believe that a base
could be a possession under one act and foreign country under another.
The Court concluded that "cession" of the area had actually been made.
60
It would seem, however, that the district court decision was consistent
with the Vermilya-Brown case in construing the statute in the light of
its policy, even though its decision did result in the same area being a
possession under one act and foreign country under another, for the
Supreme Court had merely decided that the area was a possession for
the purpose of the particular statute before it.61 The court of appeals, on
the other hand, based its decision on its own previous reasoning in the
Vermilya-Brown case,62 and in fact reinforced its stand in actually stating
that there has been cession of the area.63 This does not seem to conform
to either the Supreme Court's rationale or to its determination that the
area is foreign territory.64 It may be anticipated that further confusion
will be added when similar cases come before the courts on the issue
of whether these same statutes apply to areas in other categories.
Mr. Justice Jackson, speaking for the dissenters in the Vermilya-
Brown case, denied the existence of a question of statutory interpretation.
His view is that the statute is clear in providing that it shall apply in any
territory or possession of the United States, and thus it should be ap-
plied only to those places that are so regarded. Mr. Justice Jackson
states the issue as being whether the Court will construe the lease agree-
ment as adding the base to the United States' possessions.6 5 Examining
57. 75 F. Supp. 967 (E. D. N. Y. 1948).
58. 60 STAT. 843 (1946), as amended, 28 U. S. C. § 2671 et seq. (Cong. Serv.
1948).
59. Spelar v. United States, 171 F. 2d 208 (2d Cir. 1948).
60. Id. at 209-210 (emphasis added).
61. Vermilya-Brown Co. v. Connell, 335 U. S. 377, 386 et seq. (1948).
62. See text at notes 40-41 supra.
63. The court appears to have accepted the contention of the appellant's counsel who
did not limit his argument to the point that the area was a possession for the pur-
pose of the Tort Claims Act, but argued that the United States had in effect (if not
in form) been ceded a possession. In comparing a case involving a ceded area with
the instant case he argued, "the analogy . . . is almost perfect, except that in case
of the Philippines the acquisition was by an instrument denominated as a treaty and
in the case of the Newfoundland base the instrument was denominated as a lease.
• . . certainly the fact that in one case acquisition was by lease and in the other by
treaty is irrelevant." Brief for Appellant, pp. 7, 10, 11, Spelar v. United States, 171
F. 2d 208 (2d Cir. 1948).
64. Vermilya-Brown Co. v. Connell, 335 U. S. 377, 390 (1948).
65. Ibid.
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the limited rights acquired under the lease and the differences between
leased areas and other areas long considered as possessions, the dissent
concludes that the bases are by no means possessions, and that the Act
therefore does not apply. In view of the dissenters' finding no question
of statutory interpretation and the possibly greater justification for giving
a more narrow construction to the Tort Claims Act than to the Fair
Labor Standards Act,66 it would not be surprising if the Court reversed
the decision in the Spelar case.66b The apparent lack of guides to aid the
lower federal courts in their determination of these cases will probably
result in inconsistent conclusions which eventually will have to be re-
solved by the Supreme Court.
TRUSTEESHIP TERRITORIES
In 1947, by means of a trusteeship agreement with the Security
Council of the United Nations, 67 the United States became the administer-
ing authority for 625 Pacific islands formerly held by Japan under man-
date from the League of Nations. This agreement makes the United
States the exclusive authority in these areas, with "full powers of adminis-
tration, legislation, and jurisdiction over the territory . . . and [the
United States] may apply to the Trust Territory . . . such of the laws
of the United States as it may deem appropriate to local conditions and
requirements." 68 In addition, the United States has the right to close
the islands to other countries whenever this country deems it expedient
for security reasons. 69 This agreement is not subject to amendment, alter-
ation, or termination without the United States' consent. 0 Thus it is a
binding bipartite agreement rather than an arrangement terminable at the
will of the Security Council.
71
It can readily be seen that jurisdiction and rights in these areas are
much more comprehensive than those in the leased bases. The leased
bases are held for the sole purposes of establishment and maintenance of
military facilities. In the trust areas, although the principal American in-
terest lies in the islands' strategic importance,72 there is not the same
narrow limitation as in leased areas. No international complications
need be anticipated, for instead of having two nations as parties to the
agreement the United States and the Security Council are the parties.
The effect is to place the United States in the peculiar position of being
a party on both sides of the agreement. As a consequence, so long as
the veto power exists, this country has the ability to prevent any com-
66. See Spelar v. United States, 75 F. Supp. 967, 968 (E. D. N. Y. 1948).
66b. The Court has granted .certiorari in United States v. Spelar, 17 U. S. L.
WEEK 3312 (U. S. April 18, 1949).
67. Official Records of the Security Council, 2d Year, Supp. No. 8 at 69 (1947).
68. Art. 3, id. at 70.
69. Art. 13, id. at 73.
70. Art. 15, id. at 74.
71. See Official Records of the Security Council, 2d Year, No. 31 at 669-680
(1949). Mr. Gromyko, the Soviet delegate, offered an amendment which would permit
the Security Council to alter or terminate the agreement. Mr. Austin on behalf of
the United States commented that "it ought not to be accepted since the whole theory
of the Trusteeship System is based on the fact that there must be, in any case, at least
two parties to any Trusteeship Agreement. . . . An amendment leaving the terms
of an agreement and the power of termination to the Security Council alone is in viola-
tion of the Charter and of the theory of agreement." The amendment was not carried.
72. Hart, The United States and the Pacific Islands, 255 ANNALS 115 (1948).
plaint from ever being raised, although morally the American delegate
may be bound not to invoke the veto.73
While it appears that little differentiation can be drawn between
the status of these islands and that of owned areas, the Department of
State does make a distinction. In answering the Attorney General's in-
quiry as to the status of a trust territory in reference to the Federal
Tort Claims Act, the Legal Adviser of the Department of State replied
that no treaty of cession has been signed ceding Saipan to the United
States, no federal legislation has incorporated it into the United States,
and this country does not have sovereignty over the area by virtue of the
trusteeship agreement. The Legal Adviser therefore concluded that
Saipan is not a part of the United States nor a territory or possession.74
Hence, this department considers nothing less than ownership and conse-
quent sovereignty the requisites necessary for an area to achieve the status
of a possession. Although the Department of State has not so stated,
it appears that the United States exercises sovereignty without having it.
This is analogous to American authority in the Panama Canal Zone.75
It is surprising that Brunell v. United States,76 decided in 1948, is
the only case dealing with the applicability of federal statutes to trustee-
ship areas. At the time of this decision by the District Court for the
Southern District of New York, the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit had not yet reversed the Spelar case, nor had the Supreme Court
affirmed the Vermnilya-Brown decision. The district court concluded that
the Tort Claims Act did not apply to trusteeship territories. While this
was consistent with the Spelar case prior to its reversal, it now puts this
country in the position of having the same act in effect in an area which
bears the lowest degree of similarity to an owned area, and not in effect
in an area bearing the highest degree of similarity to an owned area. To
be consistent, any statute which, because of its policy, is interpreted to
apply to a leased 'base must at least apply to trust territories.
If the Supreme Court should continue to follow the Vermilya-Brown
reasoning in determining the applicability of statutes on the basis of the
act's policy, it should at least eradicate the type of inconsistency raised
by the Brunell case. The classification of the areas along the lines sug-
gested by this Note might serve the purpose. There is no means, how-
ever, of predicting the way the courts will actually treat trust territories.
Practically, they are owned areas; technically they most closely resemble
the Panama Canal Zone, which itself has not been consistently dealt
with; judicially, they have been given a status below that of leased areas;
politically, they are not territories since Congress has not incorporated
them, nor are they possessions since the United States does not own
them-no treaty of cession having been signed.
OccuPiED AREAs
There are but few precedents dealing with the legal status of oc-
cupied countries in relation to the United States. Most of the cases
pertaining to the law of conquest deal with territory which has been
ceded by the treaty.77  Two decisions of the Supreme Court however,
73. See Official Records of the Security Council, 2d Year, No. 31 at 669-680
(1947).
74. See Brunell v. United States, 77 F. Supp. 68, 70 (S. D. N. Y. 1948).
75. See text at notes 18-30 supra.
76. 77 F. Supp. 68 (S. D. N. Y. 1948).
77. E. g., Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U. S. 244 (1901); De Lima v. Bidwell, 182
U. S. 1 (1901).
19491 NOTES
876 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 97
do deal with the status of occupied territory. In the earlier case of
United States v. Rice,78 it was held that goods imported into the Port
of Castine in the State of Maine, while occupied by the British, could
not be taxed under the revenue laws as being goods imported into the
United States. The Court reasoned that United States sovereignty was
suspended and was vested in the British during the period of occupation.
In the later case of Fleming v. Page,79 the factual situation was reversed.
The United States had occupied the Port of Tampico in Mexico. The
Court held that goods imported into the United States from Tampico
were dutiable under revenue laws which applied to goods coming from
"foreign countries." This famous case has been cited many times and
is apparently settled law. On close examination, however, the case
would seem to have been decided on practical policy rather than estab-
lished law. The Court was careful first to state that, "As regarded all
other nations, it [Tampico] was a part of the United States, and be-
longed to them as exclusively as the territory included in our established
boundaries." 80 The Court could not see any justification for giving a
conquered enemy the benefits of tax immunity which they would receive
had the Court decided that Tampico was not foreign country. The
Court's language is clear in indicating the policy: "The custom-house was
established in an enemy's country, as one of the weapons of war. It
was [not] established . . . for the purpose of giving to the people of
Tamaulipas the benefits of commerce with the United States." 81 Thus,
if the courts so desire, they can narrow the doctrine of Fleming v. Page
to read, "For the purpose of the revenue acts, occupied areas are foreign
countries." Under such an interpretation, other statutes, which by their
terms do not apply in foreign countries, could be held to apply in con-
quered areas.8 2 In view of the importance seemingly placed on the
presence or absence of sovereignty in many of the cases in this field, it
is interesting to note that the Court in Fleming v. Page did say that Tam-
pico was "undoubtedly at the time . . . subject to the sovereignty and
dominion of the United States." 83
Recent decisions in the district courts have followed Fleming v. Page
in holding the Federal Tort Claims Act inapplicable to occupied areas.84
However, these cases were decided prior to the Supreme Court's decision
in the Vermilya-Brown case, the reasoning of which applies to occupied
areas since this country has exclusive jurisdiction therein. Since there is
jurisdiction, and since the customary statutory language is ambiguous,
the Court in the Vermilya-Brown case reasons that it is the policy of the
statute in question which will decide whether Congress intended it to
apply to the area under consideration. Therefore, while the present dis-
trict court decisions hold that the Tort Claims Act does not apply to oc-
cupied countries, it would not be inconsistent for other courts to hold that
the act does apply, citing the Vermilya-Brown case for authority.
78. 4 Wheat. 246, 254 (U. S. 1819).
79. 9 How. 602 (U. S. 1850).
80. Id. at 615.
81. Id. at 616.
82. For judicial definitions of foreign country, see Burnet v. Chicago Portrait Co.,
285 U. S. 1, 5 (1932) ; Pearcy v. Stranahan, 205 U. S. 257, 272 (1907) ; De Lima v.
Bidwell, 182 U. S. 1, 180 (1901) ; Faber v. United States, 157 Fed. 140, 141 (C. C.
S. D. N. Y. 1907).
83. 9 How. 603, 614 (U. S. 1850).
84. Brewer v. United States, 79 F. Supp. 405 (N. D. Cal. 1948) ; cf. Straneri v.
United States, 77 F. Supp. 240 (E. D. Pa. 1948).
CONCLUSION
The difficulty, confusion, and inconsistencies resulting from statutes
using the territories-and-possessions formula and the hardships caused by
failure to classify the various categories of areas are apparent. No work-
able standards have been defined by which courts may arrive at consis-
tent conclusions. A decision of one case will have little binding effect
on another case having slightly different facts, and it is more than prob-
able that the same act will be construed differently in the lower federal
courts in the absence of a positive Supreme Court decision. Administra-
tive agencies, which formerly relied upon the Department of State's de-
terminations of the status of the areas, can no longer follow such rulings
with any degree of certainty. While the political departments make
tenuous distinctions between having sovereignty and exercising sov-
ereignty, the courts have not addressed themselves to the genuine diff-
erences that do exist.
Drafters of federal legislation must be specific in designating the
areas to be covered by the statutes. The courts in every case are attempt-
ing to find the legislative intent. Thus, initially, it is the legislators'
duty to declare their intent in the clearest manner possible-trust terri-
tories are trust territories, and they should be stipulated as such in the
statutes to dispel any possibility of confusion. Congress may even find
it advantageous to designate subclassifications within the categories sug-
gested by this Note. The statutes which were in effect prior to the ac-
quisition of many of the categories of areas herein discussed should not
be immune to change, for the fact that the acts are of long standing does
not lessen the probability of confusion. Amendatory legislation must
be undertaken; perhaps a special legislative drafting committee would be
in order. The slight burden thus placed on the legislators will alleviate
the present difficulties. Congress, with its investigatory facilities and
close contact with the departments charged with the administration of the
statutes and the areas in question, is best able to weigh the relevant in-
ternational, political, social, and economic factors involved.
Should Congress be lax in addressing itself to this problem the courts
should adopt a uniform policy of narrowly construing every statute.
This will serve several purposes: (1) it will give to such a word as pos-
sessions a precise definition limiting its use to owned areas; (2) the courts
will achieve uniformity and consistency; and (3) it will force Congress
to amend the statutes if it intends other areas to be covered. Such a policy,
which has been followed by the courts in determining whether an owned
area is incorporated,8 5 can as effectively be applied to the problem of de-
termining the status of all noncontiguous areas. N.K.
Defamation-Absolute Privilege in Administrative Proceedings
The law of defamation represents a regard for the protection of in-
terests in reputation.' Sometimes, however, the interest in reputation
becomes less important for social well-being than the investigation of
matters of public concern. On such occasions, it is desirable to free the
85. See text at note 9 supra.
1. See Latin v. Union Electric Co., 350 Mo. 572, 577, 166 S. W. 2d 1065, 1068
(1942) ; RESTAT=NENT, TORTs § 559 (1938).
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participants from the fear of civil actions against them for anything they
may say or write in the course of the proceeding.2  The prime purpose
is to encourage the best persons to undertake public office and respon-
sibilities and to elicit the maximum amount of information on the sub-
ject at hand from the widest array of witnesses.3  Since the possibility
of even a "'nuisance action" may deter persons from bringing forward
valuable testimony or otherwise participating in public proceedings, it
would be inadequate to extend a merely conditional privilege 4 which
would require one accused of defamation to show that the false statement
was made in good faith.5 An absolute privilege is necessary, prohibiting
any inquiry into the motives which prompted the statement.6 The grant
of absolute privilege represents a judgment that the amount of true in-
formation gained thereby, outweighs the occasional wrong done by
malicious abuse of the opportunity to injure someone's reputation.7 Tra-
ditionally, absolute privilege has been granted to judges, attorneys, parties,
witnesses, and jurors in judicial proceedings s and to legislators 9 and high
executive officers 10 in the exercise of their proper functions.
The rapid growth of the administrative device, in recent years, to
perform public functions of great magnitude, makes absolute privilege an
appropriate concept in connection with such proceedings. Inevitably the
doctrine holds that the concept of absolute privilege is appropriate for a
"quasi-judicial" 11 but not for a merely "administrative" 12 proceeding. 3
As in most fields of law where labels become convenient devices for
describing legal results, some courts have been led to a use of the label
to reach the result. Meyer v. Parr 14 may be instanced as an extreme
example. There the court refused to privilege a letter written to a
licensing board, seeking the revocation of an embalmer's license. After
reciting the distinction to be drawn between proceedings judicial in nature
and those purely administrative, the opinion notes that under the state con-
stitution judges must be elected, and cannot be appointed. Since the
presiding officials of the licensing board were appointees, the learned
2. NEwELL, SLANDER AND LIBEL § 341 (4th ed. 1924).
3. See Cochran v. Couzens, 42 F. 2d 783, 784 (D. C. Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282
U. S. 874 (1930) ; ODGERS, LIBEL AND SLANDER 187 (6th ed., Odgers & Ritson, 1929).
4. See the introductory note to RESTATEmENT, TORTS, c. 25, topic 2, tit. B (1938).
5. White v. Nicholls, 3 How. 266 (U. S. 1845); New York and Puerto Rico
S. S. Co. v. Garcia, 16 F. 2d 734 (1st Cir. 1926).
6. Lea v. White, 4 Sneed 111 (Tenn. 1856) ; NEwELL, SLANDER AND LIBEL § 350
(4th ed. 1924).
7. See Guardian Life Ins. Co. v. Reagan, 140 Tex. 105, 113, 166 S. W. 2d 909, 913
(1942).
8. E. g., Adams v. Alabama Lime and Stone Corp., 225 Ala. 174, 142 So. 424
(1932) (libelous statement in complaint) ; see Royal Aquarium v. Parkinson, [1892]
1 Q. B. 431, 442.
9. Tanner v. Stevenson, 138 Ky. 578, 128 S. W. 878 (1910).
10. Glass v. Ickes, 117 F. 2d 273 (D. C. Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 311 U. S. 718
(1941) (Secretary of Interior) ; Mellon v. Brewer, 18 F. 2d 168 (D. C. Cir. 1927),
cert. denied, 275 U. S. 530 (1927) (Secretary of Treasury).
11. Hasset v. Carroll, 85 Conn. 23, 81 Atl. 1013 (1911); McAlister & Co. v.
Jenkins, 214 Ky. 802, 284 S. W. 88 (1926) ; GAT=EY, LIBEL AND SLANDER 186 (3d ed.,
O'Sullivan, 1938).
12. Blakeslee v. Carroll, 64 Conn. 223, 29 Atl. 473 (1894); Royal Aquarium v.
Parkinson, [1892] 1 Q. B. 431.
13. See RESTATEmENT, TORTS § 585, comment c (1938).
14. 69 Ohio App. 344, 37 N. E. 2d 637 (1st Dist. 1941).
court concludes that the proceedings cannot be said to be judicial in their
nature.
Most courts, of course, have avoided such absurd reasoning. Though
seldom expressly articulated, there seem to be two factors which ade-
quately account for many cases, and commend themselves as a direct ap-
proach to the problem of granting or withholding absolute privilege: (1)
the importance of the public function of the proceeding; 1 and (2) the
adequacy of the procedural safeguards which will probably minimize the
occurrence of defamatory statements.16
THE PUBLIC INTEREST
Since absolute privilege is a concept designed to subordinate indi-
vidual interests to the necessity of enlightened official action, it becomes
increasingly appropriate as the importance of the issues increases. In
many administrative proceedings the public interest is more directly con-
cerned than in the average civil action in court.'7 So far as function
is relevant, therefore, each proceeding must be judged on its merits. The
question has been lifigated in recent years over a wide variety of matters,
ranging from the Federal Communications Commission to local school
boards.
Only a few categories of cases seem definitely established as uniformly
privileged. In cases where awards are made, as in workmen's compen-
sation proceedings, it is well-settled that absolute privilege prevails.' 8
Similarly, in matters involving the granting of charters, certificates of
public necessity, and the licensing of professions, where honesty and com-
petency are determinative factors and the consequences to the public are
immediate and important, the trend is definitively toward the according of
full privilege.19
In numerous other types of proceedings, however, no agreement is to
be found in the cases.20 The factors which have been considered relevant
in evaluating the relative social importance of the administrative task are
varied, and sometimes of dubious significance. Thus, it has been con-
15. See Shumway v. Warrick, 108 Neb. 652, 189 N. W. 301 (1922) passim.
16. See the discussion by Judge Cardozo in Andrews v. Gardiner, 224 N. Y. 440,
121 N. E. 341 (1918).
17. See REP. ATT'y GEN. Comm. Al. PRoc. 19-20 (1941).
18. Simpson v. Oil Transfer Corp., 75 F. Supp. 819 (N. D. N. Y. 1948) ; Mickens
v. Davis, 132 Kan. 49, 294 Pac. 896 (1931).
19. Duncan v. Atchison, 72 Fed. 808 (9th Cir. 1896) (libel in ICC hearings);
Barton v. Rogers, 21 Idaho 609, 123 Pac. 478 (1912) (libel before a school board) ;
McAlister & Co. v. Jenkins, 214 Ky. 802, 248 S. W. 88 (1926) (libelous statement
before real estate board) ; Powers v. Vaughan, 312 Mich. 297, 20 N. W. 2d 196 (1945)
(libel at a hearing for the purpose of granting a masseur's license) ; Alagna v. New
York & Cuba Mail S. S. Co., 155 Misc. 796, 279 N. Y. Supp. 319 (Sup. Ct. 1935)
(letter in reference to FCC hearings) ; Hughes v. Bizzel, 189 Okla. 472, 117 P. 2d 763
(1941) (libel at a meeting of state university board of regents) ; Independent Life
Ins. Co. v. Rodgers, 165 Tenn. 447, 55 S. W. 2d 767 (1933) (mandatory statement
filed with insurance board).
20. Absolute prizilege: Bolton v. Walker, 197 Mich. 699, 164 N. W. 420 (1917)
(board of estimates) ; Nickovitch v. Mollart, 51 Nev. 306, 274 Pac. 809 (1921)
(naturalization proceedings) ; Guardian Life Ins. Co. v. Reagan, 140 Tex. 105, 166 5.
W. 2d 909 (1942) (statement filed with insurance board). Qualified privilege: Ran-
son v. West, 125 Ky. 457, 101 S. W. 885 (1907) (letter from school trustee to super-
intendent) ; Sweeney v. Higgins, 117 Me. 415, 104 Atl. 791 (1918) (board of alder-
men); Aransas Harbor Terminal R. R. v. Taber, 219 S. W. 860 (Tex. Civ. App. 4th
Dist. 1920) (hearing before railroad commission).
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sidered significant that the proceedings were not final,21 or that they were
subject to de novo review,22 or that they did not include power to grant
an award of relief,23 or that there was no power to subpoena witnesses.24
The realistic method of the better decisions may be illustrated by
Shumway v. Warrick.2 5  There an applicant for a bank charter claimed
to have been defamed by a letter to the state banking board, which ac-
cused him of malfeasance in a previous public office. In deciding the
problem of privilege, the court discussed the nature of the banking board's
function, citing the paramount public importance of granting charters
only to persons of integrity, so that the funds of depositors would be
reasonably protected. In order to encourage persons to come forward
with information about applicants, therefore, it was advisable to free them
from fear of any possible embarrassment through a civil action. Accord-
ingly, the court sustained the defense of absolute privilege, holding that
the purposes of the banking board were so important as to preclude any
investigation into the motives of those appearing before it.
Since the same administrative agency may perform more than one
function, absolute privilege may be denied in one proceeding before it,
and be granted in another. It is the importance of public function which
determines the matter, not the general nature of the agency. Charges
of fraud against an insurance agent, for example, made to a licensing
board of insurance commissioners, are fully privileged because of the
importance of screening agents as to honesty,26 but a complaint to the
same board, where the board's only function was to pass it on to competent
authority, was held merely conditionally privileged, depending upon the
good faith of the actor.2 7  The court appare.ntly felt that the first func-
tion had considerably more importance than the second.
28
THE PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS
Since the public interest is more vitally concerned in many adminis-
trative proceedings than ifi a not inconsiderable proportion of courtroom
actions, it might seem appropriate to extend a blanket immunity over all ad-
ministrative actions, as is done for judicial proceedings.2 9 That this has not
been done is in large measure to be attributed to the courts' distrust of the
fairness of the administrative process. In a courtroom the proceedings
are under the control of a judge trained in the common law rules of
evidence,80 ostensibly schooled in the habit of judicial restraint, and
21. Proctor v. Webster, 16 Q. B. D. 112 (1885).
22. Bleeker v. Drury, 149 F. 2d 770 (2d Cir. 1945) ; Proctor v. Webster, supra
note 21.
23. Powers v. Vaughan, 312 Mich. 297, 20 N. W. 2d 196 (1945); Independent
Life Ins. Co. v. Hunter, 166 Tenn. 498, 63 S. W. 2d 668 (1933).
24. Blakeslee v. Carroll, 64 Conn. 223, 29 At. 473 (1894); Aransas Harbor
Terminal R. R. v. Taber, 219 S. W. 860 (Tex. Civ. App. 4th Dist. 1920).
25. 108 Neb. 652, 189 N. W. 301 (1922).
26. Independent Life Ins. Co. v. Rodgers, 165 Tenn. 447, 55 S. W.. 2d 767 (1933);
Guardian Life Ins. Co. v. Reagan, 140 Tex. 105, 166 S. W. 2d 909 (1942).
27. Independent Life Ins. Co. v. Hunter, 166 Tenn. 498, 63 S. W. 2d 668 (1933).
28. These cases demonstrate the functional difference, but the basis of the latter
decision is of doubtful validity. The denial of privilege to a complaint addressed to
the wrong authority places too great a burden on the individual complainant to ascer-
tain definitely the proper recipient, and deters the voluntary proffering of information.
29. Wilkins v. Hyde, 142 Ind. 260, 41 N. E. 536 (1895) ; Mannix v. Portland Tele-
gram, 144 Ore. 172, 23 P. 2d 138 (1933).
30. See Royal Aquarium v. Parkinson, [1892] 1 Q. B. 431, 447.
equipped with the criminal sanctions against perjury and contempt with
which to punish malicious statements.31 Judicial readiness to regard an
administrative proceeding as entitled to absolute privilege tends strongly
to increase as the measure of safeguards against the possibility of malicious
statements is augmented. 32 Nor is it always evident that the courts have
allowed the importance of the agency's function to mitigate an unfavorable
impression caused by the relaxing of procedural safeguards. The elements
which have been considered by the cases are numerous.
Considerable attention is paid to the character of the presiding official.
His training and outlook, measured by familiarity with the duties of a
judge,33 are scanned on the theory that a competent moderator will be
able to exclude much in the way of libelous statement. The sanctions
available to him constitute one of the most important factors, and the
power to administer oaths has been considered significant.
3 4
Most weight has probably been given to a consideration of the
general structure of the rules of evidence used by the agency in the pro-
ceeding in question. Application of the hearsay rules, rules of relevancy,
and rules of materiality has been particularly noted.33 This concern for
fairness is to be cherished, of course, so long as it fulfills the function of
protecting against defamation. Since many of the evidentiary rules, how-
ever, have no relation to this function, it would be unwise to regard them
as a basis for decision. It is not possible to decide from the cases how
much the distinction has been honored, since there is a tendency toward
wholesale condemnation in general language, of suspect procedure.36 It
is submitted that many of the rules of evidence, moreover, are in the
highest degree obstructive of the goal of obtaining the maximum amount
of probative information, and have for that reason, and in view of the
specialized knowledge of many administrative tribunals, been discarded.
If the function of an agency requires the relaxing of some rules of evi-
dence, and is sufficiently important, it is fallacious reasoning to deny
absolute privilege because of the diminution of traditional procedural safe-
guards. In such cases, a delicate balancing of interests must be achieved,
so that the full privilege is allowed if a decent minimum of orderly and
rational procedure is present. Since the more important agencies tend to
develop a considerable body of procedural rules, the balance can be struck.
Where the issues are ill-defined, or there are no pleadings, rules of
relevancy cannot be applied, for lack of a yardstick.37 Since the discussion
may range unchecked over a broad area, there is unusual opportunity to
make malicious statements. Andrews v. Gardiner33' treats such a situa-
tion realistically. There counsel for a prisoner applying to a pardon board,
made defamatory remarks about one who had been instrumental in con-
victing his client. In granting only conditional privilege, Judge Cardozo
pointed out that the hearing procedure was highly informal, without de-
fined issues or competent pleadings. He concluded, therefore, that it
would be too dangerous to accord full privilege.
31. Veeder, Absolute Privilege in Defamation, 9 CoL L. REv. 463, 486 (1909).
32. See the discussion in Rogers v. Thompson, 89 N. J. L. 639, 99 Atl. 389 (1916).
33. See Royal Aquarium v. Parldnson, [1892] 1 Q. B. 431, 447.
34. Nixon v. O'Callaghan, [1927] 1 D. L. R. 1152 (Ont. Sup. Ct. 1926), 41 HARV.
L. REv. 403, 404 (1928).
35. See Andrews v. Gardiner, 224 N. Y. 440, 447, 121 N. E. 341, 343 (1918).
36. See Veeder, mipra note 31, at 486.
37. See Hale Co. v. Lea, 191 Cal. 202, 205, 215 Pac. 900, 901-902 (1923).
38. 224 N. Y. 440, 121 N. E. 341 (1918).
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Aside from the importance of the observation of the rules of evi-
dence, it is of special importance that the defamatory statement itself
be relevant to the action. Whether or not the tribunal observes the rules
of relevancy as a general rule, if the challenged remark is itself irrelevant,
it will not be entitled to absolute privilege in American jurisdictions,3 9
exception being made for remarks by the judge in a courtroom proceed-
ing. This requirement is not found in the English decisions, where rele-
vancy has weight only as it affects the evaluation of the general practice
of the agency with regard to procedural restrictions on evidence. 40 What
case law there is does not extend this privilege to irrelevant statements
made by presiding officials in lay proceedings.4 ' Except for the feeling
that judges are more likely to be circumspect than laymen, the. distinc-
tion is hard to explain. As the era of professional administrators ex-
pands, it may be expected that the notion will 'wither.
Of necessity, the bounds of administrative actions may be more
nebulous and wide-spread than in the orthodox common law action. It
is desirable, therefore, to give a liberal interpretation to the question of
relevancy. The reasonable limits of liberality may be exemplified by
Colonial Stores v. Barrett.42 The defamatory statement was made in
a certificate of availability for employment sent to a new employer of the
plaintiff, pursuant to the requirements of the War Manpower Commis-
sion. The regulations of the Commission directed employers filing such
statements not to enter remarks prejudicial to the employee in obtaining
new employment, but the defendant nevertheless made the notation that
the employee-plaintiff had been discharged as a trouble-maker. The
court, denying privilege, pointed out that the purpose of the certificate
was merely to certify that the employee was legally free to accept the
new job, and that it was entirely volunteer for the old employer to inform
the new employer of his opinion of the employee's qualifications. Indeed,
the Commission's regulations showed that it wanted to discourage just
such comments. Under the most liberal interpretation of relevancy,
therefore, the statement failed to qualify.
Earlier cases often restricted privilege to statements in response to
questions. 43 More recently, however, the view has been abandoned, since
information is to be welcomed from every source. 4" Nor is the voluntary
nature of an offer of evidence a circumstance against its reliability. In-
formal letters, for example, are entitled to the same privilege as testi-
mony elicited by questioning at a hearing in response to subpoena. 45 Any
proper part of the proceeding is immune. Pleadings,4" depositions when
introduced as evidence,47 instructions by the client to his attorney,48 peti-
39. Bartlett v. Christhilf, 69 Md. 219 (1888) (party); Hoar v. Wood, 3 Metc.
193 (Mass. 1841) (counsel); Callins v. Sumner, 13 Wis. 193 (1860) (witness).
Even where there is no absolute privilege, a qualified privilege attaches. Hyde v. Mc-
Cabe, 100 Mo. 412, 13 S. W. 875 (1890) ; Nissen v. Cramer, 104 N. C. 574, 10 S. E.
676 (1889).
40. Munster v. Lamb, 11 Q. B. D. 588 (1883).
41. Blakeslee v. Carroll, 64 Conn. 223, 29 Atl. 473 (1894).
42. 73 Ga. App. 839, 38 S. E. 2d 306 (1946).
43. E. g., Beggs v. McCrea, 62 App. Div. 39, 70 N. Y. Supp. 864 (1st Dep't 1901).
44. Independent Life Ins. Co. v. Rodgers, 165 Tenn. 447, 55 S. W. 2d 767 (1933).
45. Stafney v. Standard Oil Co., 71 N. D. 170, 299 N. W. 582 (1941) ; Higgins
v. Williams Pocahontas Coal Co., 103 W. Va. 504, 138 S. E. 112 (1927).
46. Baggett v. Grady, 154 N. C. 342, 70 S. E. 618 (1911).
47. Mannix v. Portland Telegram, 144 Ore. 172, 23 P. 2d 138 (1933).
48. Zirn v. Cullom, 187 Misc. 241, 63 N. Y. S. 2d 439 (Sup. Ct. 1946) ; More v.
Weaver, [1928] 2 K. B. 520.
tions to the agency, 49 and official reports 50 are all privileged. Since the
bounds of administrative action are not so well-defined as in courts of
law, it seems desirable to accord liberal treatment to statements made at
the inception or termination of administrative action. Thus, a letter to the
Federal Communications Commission has been treated as a complaint,9 '
while a letter to a workmen's compensation commission challenging the
fairness of an award was treated like a petition for rehearing.52  Comment
to reporters following an unfavorable decision of the National Labor Re-
lations Board, on the other hand, has been treated as entirely outside
the bounds of the proceeding, and therefore unprivileged.53
THE IMPACT OF STATUTES
In several jurisdictions, statutes grant absolute privilege to state-
ments made in the proper discharge of official duty and in the course of
any official proceedings authorized by law.54 Taken literally, these statutes
would seem to render the whole of any governmental proceeding immune.
The courts, however, have been reluctant to go so far. Submerged in
the cases, the functional and procedural considerations which govern
the nonstatutory decisions still seem determinative, although the statutes
serve to liberalize the extension of the privilege. Under such statutes,
proceedings before a university board of regents sitting on a faculty tenure
hearing, 5 and before a state athletic commission investigating bribery
charges, 9 have been held privileged, although in neither of these cases
were there competent procedural safeguards.
The limits of the statutory application may be indicated by the
denial of privilege to a letter written by a state director of a food analysis
laboratory to his counterpart in a neighboring jurisdiction, condemning
the quality of the plaintiff's product. 57  Here the court laid emphasis on
the fact that the letter was written purely voluntarily, was not an "official
duty," and was not part of any pending proceeding. Since voluntary
communications have been welcomed in other proceedings, it seems that
the court was really influenced by lack of conviction of the importance of
the function the defendant was performing, and regarded him as a mere
meddler. The opinion also makes note of the lack of procedural safe-
guards in appraising the communication.
49. Guardian Life Ins. Co. v. Reagan, 140 Tex. 105, 166 S. W. 2d 909 (1942).
50. Valesh v. Prince, 94 Misc. 479, 159 N. Y. Supp. 598 (Sup. Ct. 1916), aff'd,
224 N. Y. 613, 121 N. E. 895 (1918) ; see Murray v. Brancato, 290 N. Y. 52, 55, 48
N. E. 2d 257, 259 (1943) ; cf. Irwin v. Ashurst, 158 Ore. 61, 74 P. 2d 1127 (1938)
(broadcast of a trial held absolutely privileged).
51. Alagna v. New York & Cuba Mail S. S. Co., 155 Misc. 796, 279 N. Y. Supp.
319 (Sup. Ct. 1935).
52. Higgins v. Williams Pocahontas Coal Co., 103 W. Va. 504, 138 S. E. 112
(1927).
53. Washer v. Bank of America, 21 Cal. 2d 822, 136 P. 2d 297 (1943).
54. CAL. Civ. CODE § 47 (Deering, Supp. 1947) ; MONT. REv. CoDEs § 5692 (1935);
N. D. REv. CODE § 14-0205 (1943) ; Oa..A. STAT., tit. 12, § 1443 (1941) ; S. D. CODE
§ 47.0503 (1939).
55. Hughes v. Bizzel, 189 Okla. 472, 117 P. 2d 763 (1941) ; Sanford v. Howard,
185 Okla. 660, 95 P. 2d 644 (1939).
56. Kelley v. Daro, 47 Cal. App. 2d 418, 118 P. 2d 37 (2d Dist. 1941).
57. Hale Co. v. Lea, 191 Cal. 202, 215 Pac. 900 (1923).
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CONCLUSION
Modem courts have generally recognized that absolute privilege is
an appropriate concept f6r some types of administrative proceedings. In
deciding whether to grant the privilege, the courts have looked chiefly
to the importance of the administrative function and the adequacy of
procedural safeguards. The latter criterion has sometimes been mis-
applied by requiring rules of evidence which do not tend to prevent defama-
tion. Where statutes govern, the scope of protection has been extended,
but not to the literal extreme possible under the broad wording usually
fpund.
It is desirable to treat the administrative proceeding as sui generis,
instead of forcing it into a traditional category from whose characteris-
tics it markedly differs. Each proceeding, therefore, ought to be carefully
considered on the merits of its function, peculiar requirements, and
capabilities of improvement for protection of individual interests in repu-
tation without seriously impairing its prime purpose. It would be unwise
to grant a blanket extension of absolute privilege over the entire field.
So long as the law protects reputation, the defense of privilege must be
confined within the actual and ascertained bounds of public necessity. The
delicate balance between the individual interest and the public need must
be zealously maintained by constant judicial vigilance.
B.D.H.
Rights of a Defaulting Plaintiff in Pennsylvania
Subject to certain qualifications, a party who repudiates or defaults
in the performance of contractual obligations is not entitled to maintain an
action on the contract. Sometimes, though not always, he is also pre-
cluded from recovering in quasi contract for the benefits conferred upon
the other party to the contract.' In the latter case, whether recovery
will be allowed or denied depends on many circumstances, such as the
type of benefit the defaulting party has conferred, the extent of his per-
formance, and the degree of fault involved. Thus a court will be more
likely to grant recovery to a defaulting plaintiff who has parted with money
or transferred a chattel, than to one who has furnished services. 2 Further-
more, most courts will allow recovery for benefits conferred by a party
who has defaulted inadvertently, but will deny recovery to a "willful"
defaulter.3 These efforts, of course, manifest a judicial desire to avoid
unjust enrichment which would result to one party were he allowed to
retain the benefits conferred upon him by the defaulting plaintiff.
1. This Note will stress a defaulting plaintiff's rights in quasi contract. The
action on the contract will be discussed only to the extent necessary to portray the
present law in the light of its historical development. The outline followed is that sug-
gested by Patterson, Restitution for Benefits Conferred by Party in Default under
Contract in N. Y. LAW REVisION Com'iT REP. 195 (1942).
2. This distinction has a practical basis. Money and chattels are more easily
returnable and likewise more easily valued, while personal services are not returnable
in kind and their valuation is more difficult. See KEENER, QUAsI-CoNTRACTS 227-228
(1893) ; WOODwARD, THE LAW OF QUASI CONTRAcrS § 176 (1913).
3. RESTATEmENT, CONTRA Ts § 357 (1932). Britton v. Turner, 6 N. H. 481
(1834), the first case to allow recovery by a willful defaulter, has been followed in
only a few jurisdictions.
The common law doctrine which has prevented a defaulting plaintiff
from recovering on the contract is that of the condition precedent.4 A
condition expressed in the contract must be exactly fulfilled; otherwise
no liability can arise on the promise which it qualifies, because the validity
of an express confition. depends on the manifested intention of the
parties and hence has the same sanctity as the promise itself.5 By
liberally interpreting the express condition,6 or by using a device such as
the doctrine of waiver,1 however, courts avoid the more extreme cases
of forfeiture. The doctrine of the condition precedent was extended in
Kingston v. Preston,8 where it was announced that nonperformance of an
implied condition relieves the other party from his duty to perform. This
uncompromising doctrine, although championed as a sound instrument of
justice by eminent legal writers,9 may entail severe hardship. The propo-
sition that a failure to complete performance always bars recovery would
lead to absurd results, and might considerably stifle business activity if
carried to the extreme.10
To avoid these undesirable consequences, certain legal principles were
developed. While their precise limits are not always easy to define,
each aims at preventing forfeiture. The first mitigating doctrine to be
developed was that of substantial performance.1 The general rule is
that though a condition is not complied with, a plaintiff who has sub-
stantially performed may recover the contract price for his performance,
less any amount necessary to compensate the defendant for failure to
4. Conditions in a contract may be expressed or implied. Implied conditions are
commonly divided into those implied in fact and those implied in law. The demarcation
line between express conditions and conditions implied in fact is shadowy, as is the line
between conditions implied in fact and conditions implied in law. See Vold, Express
Conditions in Contracts, 4 N~m. L. BulL. 215 (1926). For a comprehensive discussion
of the doctrine of conditions, see Corbin, Conditions in the Law of Contract, 28 YALE
L. J. 739 (1919).
5. Diggs v. Taylor and Co., 329 Pa. 385, 198 AUt. 51 (1938) ; Miller v. Reading
Hotel Co., 248 Pa. 541, 94 Atl. 225 (1915). An extreme judicial attitude toward
express conditions in a contract is illustrated by Nelson v. Bonnhorst, 29 Pa. 352
(1857), where the court held that if a defendant's promise is conditioned on his ability
to pay, the plaintiff cannot recover unless he pleads and proves defendant's ability to
pay. See RESTATEmENT, CONTRACTS §§ 252, 258 (1932); 3 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS
§669 (rev. ed. 1936).
6. Mosser Co. v. Cherry River Co., 290 Pa. 67, 138 Atl. 85 (1927).
7. See Cape May Real Estate Co. v. Henderson, 231 Pa. 82, 86, 79 Atl. 982, 983
(1911). "The term waiver is one of those words of indefinite connotation in which
our legal literature abounds; like a cloak it covers a multitude of sins." Corbin, supra
note 4, at 754.
8. 2 Doug. 689, 99 Eng. Rep. 437 (K. B. 1773). The distinction drawn by Lord
Mansfield between independent covenants, conditions precedent, and concurrent condi-
tions has been adopted by RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §§ 266-275 (1932). For a dis-
cussion of constructive conditions, see Patterson, Constructive Conditions in Contracts,
42 COL. L. REv. 903 (1942).
9. KEENmR, QuAsi-CNTRACTs 222-227 (1893); WooxvwAR, THE LAW OF QuAsi
CONTRACTS § 164 (1913). Woodward's discussion is on the basis of assumption of risk
rather than the condition precedent as used by Keener.
10. Williston believes that courts tend to find concurrent conditions whenever pos-
sible so as to avoid requiring either party to extend credit. 3 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS
§ 835.
11. The doctrine of substantial performance first appeared in the case of Boone
v. Eyre, 1 BI. H. 273, 126 Eng. Rep. 160 (C. P. 1777). The rules for determining
the materiality of a failure to perform are found in RESTATE=NT, CONTRACTS § 275
(1932).
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fulfill the condition.12  Obviously, only limited predictability can be
achieved by a formula which depends on the content attributed to a term
as indefinite as substantial.'3 A second judicial device developed to temper
the harshness of the condition precedent is the concept of severability of
contracts. 4 Its essential feature is that a party who has not completed
performance of a divisible contract may nevertheless recover for each
part he has fully performed.' 5 The doctrine's chief limitation, of course,
is that as to each part the force of the condition predecent still applies,
and to that extent forfeiture is still possible. Here, too, the vague con-
tours of the term severable limit predictability.' 6
While the doctrines of substantial performance and severability may
properly be regarded as exceptions to the rule that nonperformance pre-
cludes action on the contract, the doctrine of quasi contract is not an
exception to that rule, but a separate principle, strictly speaking."' The
first two are rules of construction to be applied in a way that will avoid
forfeiture; the third attacks the problem more directly. The action in
quasi contract is not based on the 'defendant's promise, but on his unjust
retention of benefits.' 8 The contract price has relevance only as the
upper limit of recovery. Although there was ample historical antecedent
in the Roman law,19 the doctrine did not find its place in the common
law until Moses v. MacFerlan,20 and its development in this country
has been slow and uneven. The law of quasi contract, nevertheless, is
thought to be better adapted to attain equality and uniformity than the
other mitigating doctrines referred to above. By its more direct approach,
the theory of quasi contract avoids the necessity inherent in the other
two doctrines of giving strained constructions to the contract.
12. See Ballantine, Forfeiture for Breach of Contract, 5 MINN. L. REv. 329, 330-
333 (1921). The doctrine of substantial performance is chiefly applied in the field of
building contracts. It is also extensively applied to construction contracts requiring
architects' certificates of satisfactory performance. In Pennsylvania, production of
such a certificate is a condition precedent to recovery even though there has been sub-
stantial performance. Bush v. Jones, 144 Fed. 942 (3d Cir. 1906) ; Adinolfi v. Haz-
lett, 242 Pa. 25, 88 Atl. 869 (1913).
13. Williston criticizes the doctrine of substantial performance, insisting that it is
better to avoid hardship of this sort by allowing recovery in quasi contract than to
set aside an agreement of the parties, since when confessedly enforcing an obligation
imposed by law the court may fairly fix such boundaries as justice requires. 3 WiL-
LISTON, CONTRACTS § 805.
14. A contract is said to be divisible when the whole performance is divided into
two sets of partial performances, each part of each set being equivalent to a corre-
sponding part of the set of performances to be rendered by the other promisor. See
RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 266(3) (1932); 3 WILLISTON, CONTRAcTS § 860A.
15. See McGowan, The Divisibility of Employment Contracts, 21 IowA L. Rxv.
50 (1935). Compare Gill v. Johnstown Lumber Co., 151 Pa. 534, 25 At. 120 (1892),
with Shires v. O'Connor, 4 Pa. Super. 465 (1897).
16. See Ballantine, supra note 12, at 338.
17. See Patterson, The Scope of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment, 1 Mo. L.
Rv. 223 (1936).
18. The plaintiff, however, must offer some explanation as to how he conferred
the benefit on the defendant; otherwise he will appear in court as a meddler and re-
cover nothing. The explanation, therefore, will bring in the terms of the contract. See
RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION § 2 (1937). Woodward has criticized the use of the term
unjust enrichment as being too narrow a formulation of the quasi contractual obliga-
tion, insisting that the receipt of benefits is sufficient. WOODWARD, THE LAW OF
QUASI CoN.RAcrs § 8 (1913).
19. DIGEST 44.7.5 indicates that quasi contract, as a division of private law, was
developed to denote obligations which arose neither out of contract nor out of tort.
20. 2 Burr. 1005, 97 Eng. Rep. 676 (K. B. 1760).
It is the purpose of this Note to set forth the extent to which a de-
faulting plaintiff is allowed in Pennsylvania to recover in quasi contract
as compared with other possible forms of contractual relief.
THE STATUS OF THE LAW IN PENNSYLVANIA
Employment or Personal Service Contracts.-The majority of juris-
dictions in the United States hold that where an employee willfully de-
faults in the performance of his contract, he cannot recover either in
an action on the contract or in quasi contract.21 This view is supported
by the Restatement of Contracts 22 and by many legal writers.2 3 The
opposition is led by the much mooted case of Britton v. Turner.2 4 There
the plaintiff, a farm hand, had contracted to work for one year for a
total compensation of $120; although he quit unjustifiably after nine
and a half months, he was allowed to recover on a quantum meruit count
the reasonable value of his services, or ninety-five dollars, his employer
having suffered no damage. 25 The decision has been both severely
criticized 26 and strenuously defended.27 The flood of comments which it
provoked 28 makes it superfluous to recite here the arguments advanced
either for or against it. The gravamen of those who defend the "majority"
or common law rule is that a willful defaulter deserves no sympathy, and
that to permit him to recover with impunity would be to encourage
breaches of contract.29 The advocates of the minority rule claim that such
a mechanical denial of any compensation to a willful defaulter would often
result in forfeitures, and would introduce into the law of contract the
alien and totally unwarranted concept of punitive damages.30 The con-
troversy is still very much alive today despite efforts at compromise.31
21. See WOODWARD, THE LAW OF QUASI CONTRAcTS § 174 n. 1 (1913).
22. § 357(1).
23. See KEENER, QUASI-CoNTRACTS 218-225 (1893); WOOlVAID, THE LAW OF
QUASI CONTRAcTs § 172 (1913) ; Ashley, Britton v. Turner, 24 YAr. L. J. 544 (1915).
See also 5 WLLISTON, CoNTRAcrs § 1477.
24. 6 N. H. 481 (1834).
25. This decision has been followed directly or approved through dicta by some
eleven jurisdictions. See Patterson, Restitution for Benefits Conferred by Party in
Default under Contract in N. Y. LAW REvIsION Comm'N REP. 195, 216 (1942).
26. See note 23 supra.
27. See Laube, The Defaulting Employee-Britton v. Turner Re-viewed, 83 U.
OF PA. L. REv. 825 (1935) ; Laube, The Right of an Employee Discharged for Cause,
20 MINN. L. REv. 597 (1936) ; Mulder, The Defaulting Plaintiff in North Carolina,
15 N. C. L. REv. 255 (1937) ; Note, 24 CoL. L. REv. 885 (1924). For an extensive
review of the law in New York, see Patterson, Restitution for Benefits Conferred by
Party in Default under Contract in N. Y. LAW REvIsIoN Comm'N REP. 195 (1942).
28. For an interesting and lively exchange of opposite stands on the subject, see
Laube, The Defaulting Employee-Britton, v. Turner Re-viewed, 83 U. OF PA. L. REv.
825 (1935) ; Williston, The Defaulting Employee-A Correction, 84 id. at 68 (1935)
Laube, No Retraction, 84 id. at 69 (1935).
29. Woodward, in criticizing the decision of Britton v. Turner, says, "Considera-
tions both of policy and justice forbid its approval. One whose hands are soiled by
willful wrongdoing is hardly in a position to complain. Better far that the innocent
defendant should profit by the breach than that the guilty plaintiff should be given
a remedy in spite of it." WOODWARD, THE LAW OF QUASI CONTRAcTS § 272 (1913).
30. The longer the plaintiff works the greater would be his penalty and the more
unjust would be the benefit to the defendant. Furthermore, where the defendant has
suffered no loss he would be receiving benefits in excess of the amount of damages
he could collect if he had brought suit for breach of contract. Laube, The Defaulting
Employee-Britton v. Turner Re-viewed, 83 U. OF PA. L. REv. 825, 835 (1935).
31. See McGowan, supra note 15, at 56, suggesting that where there appears to be
great forfeiture, the courts might elect to treat the contract as severable and allow
the plaintiff to recover for each completed part.
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At any rate, it is significant to note that in the cases where the employer
wrongfully discharges his employee, it is uniformly held that the latter
can only recover the actual damages he has suffered, i. e., the wages due
him for the unexpired term of the employment, less what he earned or
could have earned elsewhere.3 2  On the other hana, if the employee will-
fully abandons his work he can recover nothing, according to most courts,
whether or not the employer was damaged. To this extent the two
rules appear inconsistent, therefore, since the measure of liability of the
guilty employer is reparation, while the measure of liability of the guilty
employee may often be forfeiture.
In the main, the Pennsylvania courts have followed the common law
rule of denying recovery to a willfully defaulting employee. Since most
cases arose before quasi contractual principles were generally accepted
in Pennsylvania, and since in many cases there is no indication that
quantum meruit was pleaded, the decisions being based on a contract
count, one may say that they are not precedents for denying recovery
in quasi contract. Many of the opinions, however, leave no doubt as to
the attitude of the courts toward willful defaulters. The earliest case
found is McDowell v. Ingersoll.3 3 There the plaintiff, engaged to survey
a body of land, left inexplicably without completely performing in the
manner prescribed by statute. The plaintiff sued in indebitatus as-
sumpsit. The court denied recovery, holding that the plaintiff, having
voluntarily left without fully performing an "entire" contract, could not
recover anything either as fees under the statute or as compensation on
principles of common law. In a later case, the court again denied re-
covery to a plaintiff who quit his contract to haul wood before he had
finished, commenting that there was no moral obligation to compensate
for the labor of a man who has deliberately cut himself loose from part
of his bargain.3 4  The court quoted with approval Mr. Justice Bracken-
ridge in Woods v. Ingersoll,3 5 where he said, "We can form no idea of a
quantum meruit for half services." Later cases evince the same judicial
attitude and reasoning.36  Recovery has sometimes been allowed, how-
ever, on the ground that the defendant accepted the part performance,
thus waiving or excusing the plaintiff's wrong.3 7 Some lower courts'
opinions show a tendency to relax the strict common law rule by in-
terpreting the contract more liberally.3 8
At common law, an employee serving under an entire contract could
not recover for services rendered if he was discharged justifiably before
32. The employer can mitigate his damages if he can show that the employee, upon
discharge, obtained or by the exercise of reasonable effort could have obtained, sim-
ilar or comparable employment elsewhere. Russel v. Barnes Foundation, 52 F. Supp.
827 (E. D. Pa. 1943), aff'd, 143 F. 2d 871 (3d Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 323 U. S. 771
(1944) ; Emery v. Steckel, 126 Pa. 171, 17 Atl. 601 (1889).
33. 5 S. & R. 101 (Pa. 1819).
34. Harris v. Ligget, 1 W. & S. 301 (Pa. 1841).
35. 1 Binn. 146, 151 (Pa. 1806).
36. E. g., Schotter v. Carnegie Steel Co., 272 Pa. 437, 116 Atl. 358 (1922) ; Shafer
v. Senseman, 125 Pa. 310, 17 Adt. 350 (1889) ; Pottsville Iron and Steel Co. v. Good,
116 Pa. 385, 9 Atl. 497 (1887).
37. Fessler v. Love, 43 Pa. 313 (1862) ; Green v. Green, 16 Pa. County 392 (C. P.
1892).
38. In Baskow v. Sliver, 95 Pa. Super. 247 (1929), plaintiff quit his painting and
paperhanging job before completion. The court sustained a verdict for the plaintiff,
saying that the contract was entire but as the finding was for an amount less than the
balance claimed by the plaintiff, the verdict would not be difturbed. See also Ely v.
Wain, 1 Weekly Notes of Cases 248 (Pa. C. P. 1875) ; Stilely v. Walker, 1 Pitt.
Legal J. 98 (Pa. C. P. 1853).
the end of the term, the rationale being that an employee who has broken
a contract has no rights under it.39 American decisions show a division
of opinion on the question.40 It is said, however, that the modern or
American rule has largely superseded the ancient one and that the em-
ployee is allowed to recover in quasi contract for services actually ren-
dered, less any damage to the employer,41 provided the employee was
not discharged because of gross misconduct or dishonesty.42  The Penn-
sylvania cases in this category exhibit little consistency. In the main,
the courts seem to have been influenced by the degree of plaintiff's
culpability, 43 ignoring the fact that they may thereby be permitting de-
fendant's unjust enrichment. Indeed, one case holds that a servant guilty
of a criminal offense noninjurious to the employer can recover no wages
due him.44  Other cases show a less drastic judicial attitude, even though
the employee was justifiably discharged for disobedience, 45 incompetence,
or neglect.46  The employee, under this view, loses only the right to re-
ceive wages for the remainder of the agreed term.47  This can hardly be
called a forfeiture, since the employee is simply losing part of his bargain
and not the value of the services he actually rendered. A remarkably
liberal attitude is shown in the case of Geraghty v. Pitcairn.48 Despite
the court's holding that the contract was entire, plaintiff, rightfully dis-
charged at the end of thirteen months of service in a contract running
for fifteen months, was allowed to recover the proportional amount of
a bonus which was not part of the regular salary but was due at the
termination of the contract. Recovery was on the contract; the court
said that while a person dismissed for cause cannot sue on a quantum
meruit, his recovery must be on a quantum meruit on the contract
basis.
The willingness of courts to avoid forfeiture and to perform sub-
stantial justice is shown by the greater recognition recently given to the
doctrine of severability of contract.49 It has been suggested that the de-
39. Turner v. Robinson, 5 B. & Adol. 789, 110 Eng. Rep. 982 (K. B. 1833); see
2 PARsoN, CoNTaAcrs 42 (8th ed. 1883).
40. See WoODWARD, THE LAW OF QUASI CONTRACTs § 174 (1913).
41. See WooD, MASTER & SERVANT § 129 (2d ed. 1905); Laube, The Right of
at Employee Discharged for Cause, 20 Min. L. REV. 597 (1936).
42. 5 WILLisTox, CONTAcrs § 1477. Woodward suggests that good faith should
be the test for allowing or denying recovery. WooDwARD, THE LAW OF QUAsI CoN-
TRAcTs § 174 (1913).
43. Ulrich v. Hower, 156 Pa. 414, 27 Atl. 243 (1893) (drunkenness); Waugh
v. Shunk, 20 Pa. 130 (1852) (failure to exercise purported skill) ; Heck v. Shener,
4 S. & R. 249 (Pa. 1818) (bad faith of housekeeper) ; Hibbard v. Wood, 49 Pa. Super.
513 (1912) (lack of fidelity to employer).
44. Libhart v. Wood, 1 W. & S. 265 (Pa. 1841).
45. Peniston v. John Huber Co., 196 Pa. 580, 46 Atl. 934 (1900); Gallagher v.
Wayne Steam Co., 188 Pa. 95, 41 At. 296 (1898) ; Matthews v. Park Bro's, 159 Pa.
579, 28 Atl. 435 (1894); Carson v. West Branch Hosiery Co., 15 Pa. Super. 476
(1900).
46. Lubriko Co. v. Wyman, 290 Fed. 12 (3d Cir. 1923); Elliot v. Wanamaker,
155 Pa. 67, 25 At. 826 (1893).
47. Gallagher v. Wayne Steam Co., 188 Pa. 95, 41 Atl. 296 (1898) ; Matthews
v. Park Bro's, 159 Pa. 579, 28 Atl. 435 (1894) ; Lightcap v. Keaggy, 128 Pa. Super.
348, 194 At. 347 (1937).
48. 104 Pa. Super. 72, 157 At1. 634 (1931).
49. Peniston v. John Huber Co., 196 Pa. 580, 46 Atl. 934 (1900) ; Gill v. Johns-
town Lumber Co., 151 Pa. 534, 25 At. 120 (1892). But cf. Pitcairn v. Philip Hiss Co.,
107 Fed. 425 (C. C. W. D. Pa. 1901) ; Shires v. O'Connor, 4 Pa. Super. 465 (1897).
See 3 WuLLsroN, CONTRAcrs § 862.
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vice of severability could provide the legal weapon for those courts which
refuse to grant recovery on a quasi contractual basis but would be will-
ing to avoid ,unjust enrichment and forfeiture by the use of a concept
more consistent with the traditional common law rules of contract.5"
The wide enactment of wage statutes requiring payment of wages at
specified intervals would seem to make the task easier. The Pennsvl-
vania statute provides for payment to employees semimonthly. 51 This,
it is thought, has the effect of fastening divisibility on a personal service
contract regardless of the intent of the parties. The effect of the statute
is limited, however, since it does not apply to all types of employees 52
or to cases where the parties have stipulated differently in the contract.5 3
Construction Contracts.54 -In many jurisdictions, a builder who
negligently defaults in the performance of his contractual obligation may
recover in quasi contract the reasonable value of his labor and materials,
less the damage caused by the breach. 55 In .Pennsylvania, perhaps be-
cause no quantum meruit count appeared in the declaration, no specific
case has been found allowing a builder in default to recover on a quasi
contractual basis, but the language of some decisions seems to indicate
that this is the basis for recovery. In Wade v. Haycock, for example, re-
covery was allowed in an action of debt for a partially defective mill
built by the plaintiff. The court said that where the work is well done
but partially defective there may be a recovery of the contract price, or in
the absence of a contract, what the work is reasonably worth, less dam-
ages for defects.56 However, no recovery can be had either on the con-
tract or in quasi contract where there has been merely partial perform-
ance.57 This holds true even if the work has been of some value to the
defendant, 58 unless the builder was prevented from completing the
project by the action of the other party,59 or by impossibility of perform-
ance, 60 or because the .partial performance was accepted by the defendant
so as to constitute a waiver of the condition to perform fully.61 Likewise,
50. McGowan, supra note 15, at 53.
51. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 43, § 251 (Purdon, 1941).
52. Commonwealth v. Marsh, 14 Pa. County 369 (Q. S. 1894).
53. Martin's Complaint, 41 Pa. County 647 (C. P. 1913).
54. The distinction drawn between construction and employment contracts is per-
haps arbitrary, and some of the cases cited under one heading may properly fall under
the other. In construction contracts, the plaintiff does not necessarily perform the
work himself, but employs other people.
55. Pinches v. Swedish Church, 55 Conn. 183, 10 Atl. 264 (1887) ; Eckes v. Luce,
70 Okla. 67, 173 Pac. 219 (1917) ; Woodford v. Kelly, 18 S. D. 615, 101 N. W. 1069
(1904).
56. 25 Pa. 382, 383 (1855) ; accord, Smith, Trustee v. Cunningham Piano Co., 239
Pa. 496, 86 Atl. 1067 (1913) ; Moore v. Carter, 146 Pa. 492, 23 At. 243 (1892) ; Pep-
per v. Philadelphia, 114 Pa. 96, 6 Atl. 899 (1886) ; Brown v. Philadelphia, 3 Sadler
45, 6 At. 904 (Pa. 1886).
57. Frank v. Allegheny County, 119 F. 2d 614 (3d Cir. 1941), citing Crawford
v. McKinney, 165 Pa. 609, 30 Atl. 1047 (1895); McClurg v. Price, 59 Pa. 420 (1868).
58. Bryant v. Stilwell, 24 Pa. 314 (1855); Danville Bridge Co. v. Pomroy, 15
Pa. 151 (1850) ; Sturts v. Ziegler, 44 Pa. Super. 124 (1910).
59. Cramp & Co. v. Central Realty Corp., 268 Pa. 14, 110 Atl. 763 (1920) ; Hayer
Bro's Construction Co. v. American Sterilizer Co., 258 Pa. 217, 101 At. 1002 (1914).
60. Hottinger v. Hoffman-Henon Co., 303 Pa. 283, 154 Atl. 598 (1931) ; Busse
v. Center Twp. School Dist., 53 Pa. D. & C. 479 (C. P. 1948).
61. Watkins v. Neff, 288 Pa. 314, 136 AtI. 221 (1927); Otis Elevator Co. v.
Flanders Realty Co., 244 Pa. 186, 90 Atl. 624 (1914). But cf. Hartupee v. Pittsburgh,
97 Pa. 107 (1881); Miller v. Philips, 31 Pa. 218 (1858).
a contractor who willfully abandons performance before completion or
willfully departs from the provision of the contract cannot recover, since
good faith and an honest endeavor to perform fully are requisite for re-
covery.62  This is consistent with the courts' attitude toward willful de-
faulters, much as that may be at variance with quasi contractual principles
of awarding reasonable compensation for benefits conferred.
The method most widely used in this country for allowing recovery
on a construction contract partially performed is the doctrine of substan-
tial performance. The rule that one must perform completely before
he can recover is relaxed where the performance is so far perfected as to
fulfill the intended purpose of the contract. 63 The aim of the doctrine is
to secure substantial justice in proper cases by relaxing the rigid and
sometimes harsh rule as to "entire" contracts, without at the same time
departing from the traditionally accepted body of common law rules.64
Relief is given because in construction contracts it may be almost im-
possible to avoid slight defects or omissions despite the most diligent
efforts, and also because the builder, who would otherwise suffer great
loss, cannot be restored to his former position by the owners.65 In Penn-
sylvania, the doctrine is construed rather strictly. The first requisite
for its application is that the default must not be too great either as to
character or magnitude; the question is one for the jury 66 unless the
variance is great, in which case it is the duty of the court to give binding
instructions for defendant.17  Good faith and an honest endeavor fully to
perform are required, allowance being made only for minor defects or
omissions.68  If a building is, so defective as to be of little or no value to
the defendant,69 or if it is not made to the satisfaction of the owner, whose
objections are genuine, or if there is a material departure from the pro-
visions of the contract, 70 no recovery can be had. Likewise, the question
of substantial performance will not be submitted to the jury if there has.
been a willful omission or departure from the contract terms.71 The courts
are emphatic in saying that recovery for substantial performance is im-
possible if one unjustifiably abandons the work. Even if abandonment
was in good faith, there can be no recovery if the plaintiff's failure to
62. Shaw v. The Turnpike, 2 P. & W. 454 (Pa. 1831); A. C. Denahan & Co. v.
Holmesburg Granite Co., 45 Pa. Super. 399 (1911).
63. E. g., Sgarlat v. Griffith, 349 Pa. 42, 36 A. 2d 330 (1944), reversing 152 Pa.
Super. 233, 31 A. 2d 555 (1943) ; Pressey v. McCormack, 235 Pa. 443, 84 AtI. 427
(1912) ; Monocacy Bridge Co. v. American Iron Bridge Mfg. Co., 83 Pa. 517 (1877);
Typhoon Air Conditioning Co. v. Fried, 147 Pa. Super. 605, 24 A. 2d 926 (1941).
64. The doctrine is regarded as equitable. See Corbin, Conditions in the Law of
Contract, 28 YAiz L. J. 739, 758-763 (1919).
65. See Ballantine, Forfeiture for Breach of Contract, 5 MINN. L. Rlv. 329, 331
(1921).
66. Pressey v. McCormack, 235 Pa. 443, 84 Atl. 427 (1912).
67. Harris v. Sharples, 202 Pa. 243, 51 Atl. 965 (1902).
68. Otis Elevator Co. v. Flanders Realty Co., 244 Pa. 186, 90 Atl. 624 (1914);
White v. Braddock School Dist., 159 Pa. 201, 28 Atl. 136 (1893) ; Moore v. Carter,
146 Pa. 492, 23 At. 243 (1892) ; Sticker v. Overpeck, 127 Pa. 446, 17 AtI. 1100 (1889);
Typhoon Air Conditioning Co. v. Fried, 147 Pa. Super. 605, 24 A. 2d 926 (1941).
69. Miller v. Philips, 31 Pa. 218 (1858).
70. Morgan v. Gamble, 230 Pa. 165, 79 Atl. 410 (1911) ; Singerly v. Thayer, 108
Pa. 291, 2 Atl. 230 (1895).
71. Gillespie Tool Co. v. Wilson, 123 Pa. 19, 16 Atl. 36 (1888) ; Shaw v. The
Turnpike, 2 P. & W. 454 (Pa. 1831) ; A. C. Denahan & Co. v. Holmesburg Granite
Co., 45 Pa. Super. 399 (1911).
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complete the work was not due to any fault of the defendant. 72  The
measure of recovery where relief is granted is determined by the contract
price as the upper limit, the amount being the difference between the
value of the work as turned over to the defendant and what it would
cost him to have it completed according to the original contract. 73  It
appears, therefore, that many cases cannot be brought within the doctrine
even if it is liberally applied, and that forfeiture will often result by
denying any relief to a plaintiff materially in default. The attitude of
punishing a willful breacher often results in an arbitrary, automatic for-
feiture, especially where the agreed performance is nearly finished. A
greater recognition and application of quasi contractual principles would
go far toward eliminating the shortcomings of the doctrine of substantial
performance.
74
Contracts for the Sale of Goods.-Since its enactment, the Uniform
Sales Act has regulated the rights and liabilities of a defaulting seller
of chattels. 75  Even before the Act's adoption, Pennsylvania courts ac-
cepted the rule fhat a seller can recover if he partially performs his con-
tract. 76  In Badger v. Shaw 77 a quasi contractual recovery was allowed
for cattle sold to the defendant, although the plaintiff seller had defaulted
in the full performance of his contract by failing to deliver some sheep
included in the same bargain. It is said that one reason for allowing a
seller in default to recover for part performance is that the buyer is often
in a position to make restitution in specie, which is not true of employees
and building contractors. 78 No distinction is made in this class of cases
between a willful and a merely inadvertent default. This is attacked as
an inconsistency by those legal writers who have protested the application
of this distinction to defaulting employees and builders. 79 Section 44 of
-the Uniform Sales Act SO codifies the rule allowing recovery to a seller
in default if the buyer has accepted or otherwise been benefited by the
goods received. If the buyer knows that the seller will not perform fully
but does not reject the goods he must pay ihe contract price for them.8'
Section 44 apparently adopts a quasi contractual measure of damages
where the buyer accepts and disposes of the goods without such knowl-
edge, since the seller may then recover the reasonable value of the goods
to the buyer.8
2
72. In re Carson's Estate, 349 Pa. 529, 37 A. 2d 488 (1944).
73. Moore v. Carter, 146 Pa. 492, 23 Atl. 243 (1892) ; Sticker v. Overpeck, 127
Pa. 446, 17 AtI. 1100 (1889) ; Ellis v. Lane, 85 Pa. 265 (1877). In some jurisdictions
recovery for substantial performance is on a quantum meruit basis. E. g., Foeller
v. Heintz, 137 Wis. 169, 118 N. W. 543 (1908).
74. See note 13 supra and text.
75. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 69, § 254.1 (Purdon, 1931). O
76. In Meyercord Co. v. P. H. Butler Co., 79 Pa. Super. 473 (1922), the court
said that the Act was merely declaratory of existing Pennsylvania law.
77. 12 S. & R. 275 (Pa. 1825).
78. WooDWARD, THE LAw OF QUASI CONTRAcTS § 176 (1913).
79. Laube, The Defaulting Employee-Britton v. Turner Re-zAewed, 83 U. OF PA.
L. REv. 825 (1935).
80. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 69, § 254.1 (Purdon, 1931).
81. The partial delivery is said to constitute a new offer, and the retention of
goods by the buyer operates as a severance of the contract. 2 WnILISToN, SALEs
§ 460 (rev. ed. 1948) ; 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1474. As to the rights of a buyer
to reject the goods, see Honnold, Buyer's Rqht of Rejection, 97 U. OF PA. L. REv.
457 (1949).
82. See 2 WILLISTON, SALES § 460 (rev. ed. 1948). The Pennsylvania cases de-
cided under this section of the Act do not shed much light as to how the courts may
interpret it.
In contrast to the rights of a defaulting seller to recover on a par-
tially performed contract, a defaulting buyer who has paid part of the
purchase price is denied, according to Pennsylvania case law, recovery
for any money so advanced,8 3 the Uniform Sales Act being silent on the
point. One may speculate whether a different result would be reached if
a substantial amount were advanced; no cases have been found squarely
presenting the question. In some jurisdictions the buyer is allowed resti-
tution, at least where no provision for forfeiture is made in the contract.
8 4
While in many cases recovery would properly be denied because the dam-
ages caused to the seller by the buyer's default equal or exceed the sum
advanced by the buyer, the courts seldom use this criterion. They say,
instead, that a plaintiff in default cannot recover against one not in de-
fault.8 5 Even where the buyer's default enabled the seller to profit by
reselling the merchandise at a higher price, the plaintiff has not been per-
mitted to recover his advances.8 6 As in the case of the defaulting seller,
no distinction is made between a buyer who is willfully in default and one
who is not, although the element of willfullness would seem to be more
apparent in sales contracts than in the cases of employment or building
contracts.8 7 The Pennsylvania Conditional Sales Act 8 provides that a
buyer under a conditional sale contract who has paid fifty per cent or more
of the purchase price before the seller retakes the goods, is entitled to re-
cover the amount in excess of the seller's damages and expenses of re-
sale.8 9
Contracts for the Sale and Purchase of Realty.-The Pennsylvania
courts have consistently held that where a vendor defaults in the perform-
ance of his contract to convey after the vendee has paid part of the pur-
chase price, and this failure is not due to bad faith or fraud, a vendee who
is not himself in default may rescind the agreement and recover the
amount paid. 0 A vendee is not entitled to recover for the loss of his
bargain, however, even if he would have derived a considerable profit from
completion of the transaction.91 The policy of the courts in these cases
83. E. g., In re Oscar Nebel Co., 117 F. 2d 326 (3d Cir. 1941) ; Dluge v. White-
son, 292 Pa. 334, 141 Atl. 230 (1928) ; Atlantic Tire Rubber Co. v. Southwark Foun-
dry, 289 Pa. 569, 137 AUt. 807 (1927). Contra: Graham v. Lebanon, 240 Pa. 337, 87
Atl. 567 (1913).
84. Cherry Valley Iron Works v. Florence, 64 Fed. 569 (6th Cir. 1894) ; Sabas v.
Gregory, 91 Conn. 26, 98 At. 293 (1916) ; Humphrey v. Sagouspe, 50 Nev. 157, 254
Pac. 1074 (1927).
85. See it re Oscar Nebel Co., 117 F. 2d 326, 328 (3d Cir. 1941) ; Dluge v. White-
son, 292 Pa. 334, 335, 141 Atl. 230, 231 (1928).
86. Dluge v. Whiteson, mspra note 85.
87. See Patterson, Restitution for Benefits Conferred by Party in Default under
Contract in N. Y. LAw REVISIoN Comm'N REP. 195, 232 (1942).
88. P.. STAT. ANN., tit. 69, §§ 454, 456 (Purdon, 1931).
89. Section 454 provides for compulsory resale of the goods by the seller. Section
456 provides for return to the buyer of the amount in excess of expense of resale and
the seller's damages. No Pennsylvania case decided under § 456 has been found.
90. E. g., Moser v. Jacob Brown Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 320 Pa. 371, 182 Atl. 531
(1936); McClenachan v. Malis, 310 Pa. 99, 164 Atl. 780 (1933) ; Klee v. Silver, 88
Pa. Super. 318 (1926).
91. Kargiathy v. Provident Trust Co., 338 Pa. 358, 12 A. 2d 11 (1940) ; Rineer
v. Collins, 156 Pa. 342, 27 At. 28 (1893) ; Hertzog v. Hertzog, 34 Pa. 418 (1859) ;
Bitner v. Brough, 11 Pa. 127 (1849). Recovery for loss of bargain is allowed in case
there is collusion or bad faith. Seidleck v. Bradley, 293 Pa. 379, 142 Atl. 914 (1928)
McDowell v. Oyer, 21 Pa. 417 (1853).
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is to put the parties back where they were at the time of making the con-
tract, rather than to compensate the purchaser for loss.
92
In contradistinction, if the vendee defaults after making payments on
the purchase price of a piece of real estate, he cannot rescind and recover
from the vendor what he has paid.9 3 This is so, provided the vendor was
ready and willing to perform, even though the vendee would not have
been able to compel performance of the agreement.94 Once again the
reason given for denying recovery is that one guilty of a breach should
never be allowed to profit by his wrong.95 Whether the money paid by
the vendee is an advance on the purchase price, or a deposit as earnest
money, or a sum which the contract provides should be forfeited as
liquidated damages in case of breach, the vendee who has defaulted while
the vendor stood ready and able to perform is denied recovery.,6  Even
the fact that the vendor resold the property and received more than he
would had plaintiff performed, does not render the vendor liable to ac-
count to the vendee for the latter's partial payments97 In some cases
where plaintiff's forfeiture was deemed too great, the courts have found
that the vendor "waived" certain provisions of the contract, 98 or that he
exercised the option provided in the contract to treat the contract as void
and confess judgment in ejectment against the vendee9 9 As was ob-
served in the cases of sales of goods, in many realty cases the money
forfeited by the plaintiff is less than the damages which the vendor suffered
'through the plaintiff's refusal to complete the contract. The amount ad-
vanced by the vendee often is small, and the seller's damages are not
susceptible of objective appraisal, so that retention of the buyer's pay-
ment may fairly be regarded as liquidated damages.' 0 0 In these factual
situations, no injust enrichment or forfeiture results from the courts' re-
fusal to permit one in default to recover, but quasi contractual principles
are violated if a defaulting plaintiff is denied recovery of the amount by
which his payments exceed the loss suffered by defendant.
92. This is said to be an outgrowth of solicitude for innocent vendors who, because
of the unsettled state of titles in early times, would be taking a great risk in entering
into an executory contract for the sale of real estate if the vendee were allowed to
have a jury speculate as to the actual value of the land over and above the contract
price. See Note, 48 A. L. R. 12, 13 (1927).
93. Wasserman v. Steinman, 304 Pa. 150, 155 Atl. 302 (1931) (contract for sale
of land for $175,000; plaintiff put $5,500 in deposit) ; Sanders v. Brock, 230 Pa. 609,
79 Atl. 712 (1911) (sale of building for $104,000; $2,000 in deposit) ; Boyd v. McCul-
lough, 137 Pa. 7, 20 Atl. 630 (1890) (sale of land for $1,350; buyer paid $811);
Hathaway v. Hoge, 1 Sadler 119, 1 At. 392 (Pa. 1885) (sale of land; buyer paid
over half of the contract price) ; Shamlian v. Waxman, 80 Pa. Super. 73 (1922) (sale
of city property for $18,000; buyer paid $1,000) ; Lichetti v. Conway, 44 Pa. Super. 71
(1910) (sale of city property for $8,000 subject to ground rent of $25,000; buyer
paid $500). See RESTATEmENT, CoNTRAcTs § 357 (1932) ; 3 WILLisToN, CONTRACTS
§ 791; Corbin, Right of a Defaulting Vendee to Restitution of Installment Paid, 40
YALE L. J. 1013 (1931).
94. Hathaway v. Hoge, supra note 93; Power v. North, 15 S. & R. 12 (Pa. 1826).
95. See the opinion in Boyd v. McCullough, 137 Pa. 7, 20 Atl. 630 (1890).
96. Wasserman v. Steinman, 304 Pa. 150, 155 Atl. 302 (1931) (contract pro-
vided for forfeiture in case of breach) ; Sanders v. Brock, 230 Pa. 609, 79 Atl. 772
(1911) (advance on purchase price) ; Shamlian v. Waxman, 80 Pa. Super. 73 (1922)
(earnest money to be forfeited in case of breach).
97. Sanders v. Brock, supra note 96; cf. Zierdt v. Keal, 98 Pa. Super. 604 (1930).
98. Moser v. Jacob Brown Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 320 Pa. 371, 182 Atl. 531 (1936) ;
Wolson v. Freihofer, 84 Pa. Super. 561 (1925); Lowenstein v. Armstrong, 27 Pa.
Super. 543 (1905).
99. Howard v. Stillwagon, 232 Pa. 625, 81 Atl. 807 (1911).
100. See Corbin, Right of a Defaulting Vendee to Restitution of Installment Paid,
40 YALE L. J. 1013 (1931).
CONCLUSION
An analysis of the Pennsylvania cases shows that the rights and
remedies of a plaintiff who has failed to perform his contractual obliga-
tions are at best uncertain and inadequate. Generally he has been denied
recovery of the benefits he has conferred upon the other party by his par-
tial performance. The law of quasi contract, which seeks to compensate
for actual loss suffered through breach, while preventing unjust enrich-
ment or forfeiture, has played very little part in the decisions and has
seldom been the basis for denying or allowing recovery to the defaulting
party, either because the declaration contained no quasi contract count, or
because the courts preferred to base their holdings on the more orthodox
doctrines of contract. The doctrines which developed to provide relief
for the more acute cases of forfeiture-substantial performance, sever-
ability, and waiver-do not fully answer the problem. They often involve
a strained and fictitious construction of the contract, which many courts
refuse to make, and they are limited in their application. The doctrine
of quasi contract, since it is not concerned with giving effect to the con-
tract, is more flexible and therefore more adequate. Furthermore, to dis-
cuss the problem in fictitious terms tends to becloud the real issue; greater
clarity would result if the question were dealt with frankly, in terms of
rules based on fairness and justice. The element of willfulness of a breach,
emphasized in employment and building contracts and entirely disregarded
in sales contracts, not only creates inconsistency in the law, but also in-
troduces a concept not properly a part of the law of contract, which aims
to compensate and not to punish. While exemplary damages may, under
proper circumstances, be allowed to discourage the contract breaker, yet
to compel forfeiture where the defendant has received valuable benefits
and where no relation exists between the damages caused and the bene-
fits conferred, seems treatment too harsh even for a plaintiff unjustifiably
in default.
A.D.
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